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Abstract
Social choice is the study of the issues arising when a population
of individuals attempts to combine its views with the objective
of determining a collective policy. Recent research in artificial
intelligence raises concerns of artificial intelligence agents apply-
ing computational resources to attack an election. If we think
of voting as a way to combine honest preferences, it would be
undesirable for some voters cast ballots that differ from their
true preferences and achieve a better result for themselves at the
expense of the general social welfare. Such an attack is called
manipulation. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem holds that
all reasonable voting rules will admit a situation in which some
voter achieves a better result for itself by misrepresenting its
preferences. Bartholdi and Orlin showed that finding a ben-
eficial manipulation under the single transferable vote rule is
NP-Complete. Our work explores the practical difficulty of the
coalitional manipulation problem. We computed the minimum
sizes of successful manipulating coalitions, and compared this to
theoretical results.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Social choice is an academic field concerned with the complexities and issues
arising from a population of individuals with disparate interests attempting
to combine the views of its individuals in a structured manner. The objective
of such a process is usually to determine a collective policy for the popula-
tion’s future behavior. Such a process is core to the notions of democracy and
self-determination. If a population can be said to have self-determination, it
must reliably be able to determine its own collective course of action. Poli-
tics is the name given to this process when the population is humans. The
broader term social choice refers to any society. Recent research in artificial
intelligence gives rise to concerns of social choice applied to populations of
artificial intelligence agents [ER91, ER93]. Of special concern in this setting
is the availability of computational resources to individuals in the popula-
tion. Considering the availability of computational resources to members
of the society, methods and protocols must consider both the positive and
adverse effects such computational power could have on the process. This
gives rise to the relatively young field of computational social choice, which
examines precisely these consequences.
A general method for combining the views of many individuals is by
voting. When voting, individuals record their opinions about the various
alternatives to some medium, and the votes are pooled. A predetermined
rule is then applied to the pool of votes to determine the winner.
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Informally, a voting rule is a function that selects in a prescribed manner
a winner from a group of candidates using a collection of votes. These votes
often express more than simply a preference for one alternative over all
others—the most common case in human political elections. It is possible
for voters to express approval and disapproval of alternatives, to rank the
alternatives, and even to enumerate the strength of their preference for the
alternatives. Most voting rules examined in the literature use the definition
of a vote as a complete ranking of all the alternatives, without ties. We use
this model here.
When comparing voting rules, social choice researchers examine them on
the basis of their satisfaction of certain criteria: intuitive properties which
are seen as good properties for voting rules to have. There are intuitive
behaviors voting rules should exhibit. The central idea behind voting is
that the voters collectively choose the outcome with their votes. There-
fore the voting rules should respond to the voters’ votes. A voting rule is
called Pareto-optimal if when every voter prefers some alternative to some
other alternative the rule should not select as the winner the alternative
unanimously disliked by the voters. Being Pareto-optimal does not require
that a rule always select a candidate that is preferred by a majority of the
voters—there may not be such a candidate—but intuitively a voting rule
should never choose a candidate if there is another candidate preferred by
everyone.
Another criterion that seems sensible for a voting rule is that it use in-
formation from more than one ballot. If a rule only looked at one ballot, and
selected that ballot’s top ranked choice as the winner, it would be Pareto-
optimal, but we would hope that a rule considers the input of all the voters.
If a rule only considers one ballot, we say that the rule is dictatorial.
These two criteria are derived from a basic notion of fairness. It is hard
to argue that a voting rule need not satisfy the above criteria. Consequently,
every voting rule that is seriously considered for actual use satisfies these
basic requirements.
Two other important criteria to consider when examining voting rules
are monotonicity and independence-of-irrelevant-alternatives (abbreviated
3IIA). These criteria are in a sense stronger than the Pareto-optimality and
non-dictatorship. There are many sensible voting rules that do not satisfy
these criteria, including many voting rules used in practice.
Monotonicity in a voting rule considers how the outcome of an election
would change by moving a candidate up on some of the ballots. If moving
the candidate up on some ballots (and down on none) leads to that candi-
date doing worse in the overall election, that would violate monotonicity.
This need not be a common occurrence: if it is at all possible for such a
situation to arise, then the voting rule is non-monotonic. Non-monotonicity
means moving the current winner up on some ballots could cause that can-
didate subsequently to lose the election. In one sense, monotonicity is very
important to voters having confidence in the electoral process. A voter
should feel that a vote for a particular candidate helps that candidate win.
If a voting rule is not monotonic, the voter cannot be sure of that. The
voter may wonder what is the point of voting if expressing their support
for a preferred candidate may cause that preferred candidate to do worse.
A non-monotonic voting rule is not completely untrustworthy however: A
non-monotonic voting rule may in fact only fail the monotonicity criterion
for a few cases. An example of a non-monotonic voting rule is the instant
runoff voting rule. Consider the following election between three candidates
a, b, and c. Suppose 39 voters vote a > b > c, 35 vote b > c > a, and 26
vote c > a > b. The victor here is a: No candidate has a majority, so c
is eliminated first. The 26 votes of c > a > b transfer to a, making a the
winner. However, if 10 of the b > c > a voters raise a to the first position
on their ballots (becoming a > b > c voters), c is now the winner: b is
the first eliminated, and the 25 remaining b > c > a votes transfer to c,
giving a majority and a victory to c. Thus the instant runoff voting rule is
non-monotonic.
IIA states that irrelevant candidates do not alter the outcome of the
election. Declaring a candidate irrelevant in a political election is likely to
raise ire from that candidate’s supporters, but as far as social choice research
is concerned, an irrelevant candidate is any candidate that does not win. A
voting rule that is unaffected by irrelevant candidates produces the same
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winner if any or all of the non-winners did not run, given that the order of
the other candidates on each ballot remains the same. For example, in an
election under the plurality voting rule with three candidates, a, b, and c,
where a and b each have 41% and 39% of the vote respectively, c has 20%
of the vote, and c’s supporters prefer b to a (after c)—a is the winner of the
election as stated, but if the loser c were to drop out, b would become the
winner. Thus plurality does not satisfy IIA.
One of social choice’s earliest and most well-known results is Kenneth
Arrow’s impossibility theorem, which colloquially states that there is no
perfect voting rule [Arr51]. Arrow’s impossibility theorem states that there
is no Pareto-optimal, non-dictatorial voting rule that operates on more than
two candidates which is also monotonic, and for which irrelevant candidates
never alter the outcome of the vote for the other candidates.
Monotonicity, Pareto-optimality, non-dictatorialism, and independence-
from-irrelevant-alternatives are all properties examined when comparing
voting rules. Arrow’s Theorem shows that they cannot all be simultane-
ously satisfied by a single voting rule if the election has more than two
candidates. Pareto-optimality and non-dictatorialism are relatively easy to
satisfy and it is hard to argue that a voting rule that does not satisfy them
is reasonable. Voting rules that are used in practice typically violate mono-
tonicity or, more often, IIA. As shown in the examples above, plurality
violates IIA, and instant runoff voting violates both monotonicity and IIA.
The Borda count and the veto rule violate IIA.
Two other disappointing results for the concept of fairness in social choice
are the Gibbard-Satterthwaite and Duggan-Schwartz theorems. Generally
speaking, we would like to think of voting as a way to combine people’s
honest preferences. In this regard it would be undesirable for some voter to
be able to record preferences on the ballot that are different from its true
preferences, and in so doing achieve a better result for itself at the expense
of the general social welfare (i.e., causing the outcome of the election to be
different than what it would have been if all voters voted their true prefer-
ences). Such an attack is called manipulation in the social choice literature.
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem holds that every non-dictatorial vot-
5ing rule that picks a single winner and does not preclude any candidates
from winning admits a situation for which some voter achieves a better
result for itself by misrepresenting its preferences [Gib73, Sat75]. Duggan
and Schwartz generalized Gibbard-Satterthwaite for voting rules that select
multiple winners. The Duggan-Schwartz theorem added that as long as the
rule does not simply declare every election a tie, then that rule also admits
a situation for which some voter achieves a better result by misrepresenting
its preferences [DS00]. However, neither of these results imply that a voter
intending to manipulate the election by voting disingenuously can always
do so, or moreover, even if they can, that they can find such a manipulation
easily.
A malicious artificial intelligence agent or group of agents could easily
have direct access to computational resources to aid in selecting a vote or
votes that will produce the best outcome for the malicious group, which may
be very different from the preferred outcome for the whole voting population.
Moreover, it is conceivable for the attackers to know how the other members
of the group will vote. A careless voting protocol design may allow for
eavesdropping on votes as they are collected through a man-in-the-middle
attack. In the case of voting by artificial intelligence agents it is possible
that the malicious agents could have copies of the source code of the other
agents. In this case they could simply run instances of the non-malicious
agents using the their own private computational resources to determine the
votes of the others.
Bartholdi, Tovey and Trick first examined the computational hardness
of finding a manipulation beneficial to the manipulator [BTT89a]. Suppose
a voting rule we wish to use has situations where a voter can achieve a better
result for itself through manipulation. If that voter is unable to efficiently
find such a manipulation, that will likely deter strategic voting. Bartholdi
and Orlin showed that finding a beneficial manipulation under the single
transferable vote rule is NP-complete [BO91], even with one manipulator.
Their result however requires that the number of candidates and the number
of voters be unbounded. If either are bounded, and the votes are unweighted,
then the problem is in P by brute force (for voting rules that are in P).
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Conitzer and Sandholm began to examine the complexity of both con-
structive and destructive manipulation when the number of candidates is
fixed in [CS02]. Constructive manipulation asks if the coalition can make a
specific candidate become a winner, while destructive manipulation asks if
the coalition can merely prevent a specific candidate from being a winner.
They determine the complexity for constructive and destructive manipula-
tion under several voting rules for which determining the winner is in P, for
cases where the manipulator votes are weighted, as well as for cases where the
manipulators do not have perfect information about the non-manipulators’
votes but have only probability distributions for their votes. They show that
with a fixed number of candidates and a voting rule whose winner problem
is in P, unweighted constructive coalitional manipulation is in P, as there
are only polynomially many ways for the coalition to vote.
Conitzer and Sandholm also found a method of modifying any voting rule
to raise its difficulty to NP-hard by adding a pre-round which eliminates half
of the candidates by simulating the first round of a binary single-elimination
tournament [CS03]. The candidates are paired according to some schedule,
and the pairwise election is held between each pair. The losers of these
preliminary contests are immediately eliminated, and the winners go on to
participate in the election under the original voting rule. Depending on the
method used to generate the pairings for this first elimination round and
when the pairings are published in comparison to when the votes are cast,
the technique elevates the complexity of manipulation to NP-hard, #P-hard,
or PSPACE-hard.
Elkind and Lipmaa adapted the technique of [CS03] to secure the pre-
round against influence by election administrators by generating the pairings
with one-way functions (assuming one-way functions exist), and in so doing,
expanded the hardness guarantees to more than one manipulator [EL05].
While it is interesting to know that there are universal tweaks that can
be made to a voting rule to raise the difficulty of its manipulation, the
modifications they describe are hard to argue for. They alter voting rules in
such a way that the modified rules seem fundamentally different. Supporters
of candidates eliminated in the pre-round will argue that their candidate
7was prematurely eliminated. It is an aphorism that the point of voting
is to convince the losers that they lost. If the goal of voting is indeed to
convince the losers and their supporters that they lost, then these pre-rounds
may prevent this. In a close race, the pre-round schedule may be the sole
differentiation between a winner and a loser, and a different schedule may
yield a different outcome. This is undesirable in general.
Additionally, this line of research considers only worst-case hardness
measures like NP-hardness. It may be the case that for some elections,
under a given voting rule, a manipulative voter or coalition of voters may
not be able to influence the result at all. In some other elections, they may
be able to alter the outcome of the election only after great difficulty and
much computation. In still other elections, they may be able to alter the
outcome the election quite easily. While establishing NP-hardness for a ma-
nipulation problem guarantees no efficient algorithm for all cases (without
admitting P = NP), we would generally like to be sure that a coalition of
manipulators cannot efficiently find a beneficial manipulation in a typical
election. Perhaps a great fraction of the elections that are likely to arise
in practice are easily manipulable. The hardness model that captures this
idea is that of a problem being “usually hard.” This hardness model is seen
in the study of cryptography. It is not acceptable for a cryptographic sys-
tem to be merely NP-hard, or even hard “on average” in the Levin sense
[Lev84], since it is still possible for there to be only 1/poly(n) of the in-
stances which are hard. A cryptographic system must be hard in the vast
majority of individual instances that are likely to arise in practice, prefer-
ably having zero, or only O(1) weak instances like, e.g., the weak keys of
DES [TW01]. Moreover, it is not entirely clear which distribution of votes
is the most appropriate to consider. Black and many other authors have
argued that uniform distribution is in fact not representative of electoral
preferences in many cases, and that the single-peaked distribution is more
appropriate [Bla48, Bla58, NW87, DHO70, PR97, Kre98].
Conitzer and Sandholm first raised the question of manipulation com-
plexity in the average case in [CS03], and Elkind and Lipmaa showed that
it is not possible to elevate the average case complexity of manipulation of
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a voting rule in P simply by adding a pre-round to it [EL05].
Conitzer and Sandholm continued to explore of the possibility of aver-
age case hardness in [CS06]. They showed that for any monotonic voting
rule which is executable in polynomial time, when there are exactly two
candidates that could ever possibly be made to win considering the non-
manipulators’ votes and the entire combinatorial space of all possible ways
the manipulators could vote, there is a polynomial-time algorithm which
finds both of these candidates and provides a corresponding set of manipu-
lator votes to make each the winner. The basic idea of the algorithm is as
follows. If the voting rule is executed on the non-manipulators’ votes alone,
then the winning candidate there is one of the possible winners, because the
manipulators can cast ballots with that same candidate in the first position,
and under a monotonic voting rule, that candidate will remain the winner.
Finding the second possible winner involves looping over all other candi-
dates to test their electability by computing the result of the voting rule
on the union of the non-manipulators’ votes and the manipulators’ votes,
placing the currently winning candidate in last place on all of the manipu-
lators’ ballots, placing the candidate being tested in first place, and using
an arbitrary ordering for the rest of the candidates. Since, by assumption,
the manipulators could make exactly two candidates win, the ordering of
the other candidates does not matter and the given votes are sufficient to
make the other candidate win. They go on to demonstrate that under a
specific distribution of non-manipulator votes and for a fixed size coalition,
the frequency of cases where the manipulators can make three or more can-
didates win is small when compared to the frequency of cases where exactly
two candidates can be made to win. From this they conclude that average
case hardness is not possible for monotonic voting rules.
Their algorithm is unable determine however if, in fact, there are exactly
two possible winners. If there are more than two possible winners, it could
produce one, two, or any number up to all of these possible winners.1 Fur-
thermore, it gives no concrete determination of the actual number of possible
1The algorithm as presented in their paper stops after finding the second possible
winner, but it is easily modifiable to continue the search for more.
9winners, nor a resolute answer on the electability (under manipulation) of a
particular candidate if it did not give a witnessing set of manipulator votes.
They remark that instances in which only one candidate could ever be
made to win are uninteresting, since the manipulators are out of luck and
are unable to alter the outcome of the election. In the case where exactly
two candidates can win, the manipulators’ job is easy, since the polynomial-
time algorithm could be applied to find both winners and the precise votes
needed to make them win. The manipulators’ job then can only be hard in
instances where more than two candidates could be made to win. But it is
not easy to determine, generally, when this algorithm reports that some of
the candidates can win, if any other candidates could have won under an
appropriate manipulation. The usefulness of this algorithm depends on how
often in practice it is possible for a manipulating coalition of a given size
to make one, two, or more of the candidates win. The distinction between
one candidate being the only possible winner, and the algorithm reporting
only one possible winner is significant. If a coalition can make three or more
candidates win, but is only able to make a candidate other than the current
leader win by voting differently from one another, Conitzer and Sandholm’s
algorithm would report only one possible winner, and miss the other two.
The question then is how often do these cases that could cause a problem
for Conitzer and Sandholm’s algorithm arise in practice? Further empiri-
cal investigations into the frequency at which these instances occur would
provide some insight into the applicability of their result. How often can
exactly one candidate be made to win, when two, and when more?
The distributions they examined tend toward increasing distinction be-
tween successive candidates as the number of non-manipulators increases.
Consequently, this distribution underrepresents instances where there are
comparably-sized camps of like-minded voters with strong conflicts in the
preference orders between the camps. These distributions would seem to
be the most promising place to find hard instances. Additionally, they
only examined fixed-size manipulating coalitions. They did not vary the
coalition size with the number of non-manipulators. As the number of non-
manipulators grows, the fixed-size coalition is unsurprisingly seen to have
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rapidly diminishing influence over the election.
What happens when the number of manipulators is varied in propor-
tion to the number of non-manipulators? If the non-manipulators’ votes
are being drawn consistently from a known distribution, it is intuitive that
proportionally increasing the number of manipulators would yield similar
amounts of influence to the manipulators. Conitzer and Sandholm do note
that if three or more candidates can be made to win, it is possible that some
of those candidates can only be made to win if some of the manipulators
vote differently than others. Having to vote differently from one another is
not a concern for the manipulators when only two candidates can be made
to win. When three or more can be made to win, this does become im-
portant, especially considering that if the relative fraction of manipulators
to non-manipulators is large and the manipulators have more power, it be-
comes important not to make a candidate they dislike become the winner
accidentally by, say, placing that candidate in the second position on all of
their ballots.
Procaccia and Rosenschein revealed a clearer picture of the region where
manipulation problems are interesting and possibly difficult [PR07]. Coali-
tions that are too small will often not have enough power to change the
result of an election. Coalitions that are large will often be able to do so
easily. Procaccia and Rosenschein put bounds on the fraction of votes that
can come from manipulators for the problem to be hard with any frequency.
They demonstrated based on the Central Limit Theorem and Chernoff’s
bounds that as long as the distribution of votes are minimally random and
that the individual votes are independent and identically distributed, then
only the manipulation problems where the total weight of the manipulators
is Θ(
√
n) could be hard, where n is the number of non-manipulators. If the
size of the coalition is o(
√
n), it is too small — the probability that they
will be able to influence the outcome tends to 0 as n increases. If the coali-
tion size is ω(
√
n), it is large enough to easily change the outcome — the
probability that they can manipulate tends to 1 as n increases.
The above result would seem to suggest a critical size for the manip-
ulating coalition in order for manipulation problems to be hard, and that
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critical size appears to be around m = Θ(
√
n). Walsh investigated empiri-
cally the difficulty of manipulation when the coalition was near this critical
size [Wal09b]. For a coalition of manipulators with weighted votes, with
uniformly randomly distributed weights, and total weight equal to c
√
n (c
is the constant implied by Θ-notation), Walsh observed a smooth transition
in the probability of a random election being manipulable under the veto
voting rule. Worthy of remark is that the probability of instances being ma-
nipulable smoothly changed from 0 to 1 as the function 1− 23ec. The shape of
the transition did not change as n was increased. The smooth transition re-
sembled more the transition of problems with known polynomial algorithms
than it did the transition of NP-hard problems, whose transitions resemble
a sigmoid shape and grow more to resemble a step function as n increases.
Walsh also investigated the manipulability of single transferable vote by
a single manipulator, as well as the difficulty of the search to find a beneficial
manipulation or prove that none exists [Wal09a]. The analysis considered
elections with up to 128 voters and 128 candidates. Votes were drawn from
the uniform distribution, the Polya Eggenberger urn model [Ber85] (a dis-
tribution over elections that tends toward highly correlated votes), as well
as two sampled real world voting data sets. Using an improved form of a
method given by Conitzer [Con06], Walsh was able to determine whether
elections could be manipulated by a single manipulator at a very low com-
putational cost, even with 128 non-manipulators and 128 candidates to or-
der. While the theoretical upper bound on the computational complexity of
Conitzer’s algorithm was O(n1.62m), the observed behavior of the algorithm
was closer to O(n1.008m) for uniform votes, and O(n1.001m) for elections
drawn according to the urn model. In practice this meant it was easy to
compute the manipulability status of the sample elections.
Friedgut, Kalai and Nisan made a troubling discovery about the average
case difficulty of manipulation [FKN08]. This result has been referred to as
a “quantitative version” of Gibbard-Satterthwaite. Their result applies to
voting rules that are neutral and far from being a dictatorship. A voting rule
is neutral if it is blind to the identities of the candidates (i.e., the result of the
election commutes with all permutations of the candidate set). The distance
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from a dictatorship is measured by how often the result of the election differs
from the will of any single voter, i.e., a potential dictator. Consider that
it is possible to design a voting rule that functions as a dictatorship in
all cases except, say, for one very precise profile of votes. Such a voting
rule would be considered not a dictatorship. The notion of distance from a
dictatorship formalizes the need for the voting rule to consider the input of
at least two and hopefully many voters, and that it should do this most if
not all of the time. This condition is less strict than requiring the rule to be
anonymous, i.e., requiring that it treat all voters identically, but certainly
an anonymous rule would satisfy it. Friedgut et al. showed that as long a
voting rule is neutral and far from a dictatorship, then it will be manipulable
in the average case by a single manipulator, under the uniform distribution
of votes, for elections of exactly three candidates. Though they were only
able to prove their theorem for the case of exactly three candidates, most of
their proof generalizes to more than three candidates, and they conjecture
that their theorem holds in the general case.
Xia and Conitzer proved a theorem similar to the one proved by Friedgut
et al. which does extend to the general case of more than three candidates
[XC08]. While their theorem does place more requirements on the voting
rule in question, nevertheless many popular voting rules still satisfy the con-
ditions. In particular, scoring protocols, single transferable vote, Copeland
(with 5 or more candidates), maximin, and ranked pairs all meet the condi-
tions.
Isaksson, Kindler and Mossel were able to fully extend Friedgut et al.’s
theorem to the general case, in both number of voters and number of can-
didates [IKM10]. They were further able to give an exact formula for the
probability of manipulation, using the same assumptions about the voting
rule and distribution of non-manipulator votes as Friedgut et al. Under the
uniform distribution of votes, a coalition of voters can find a manipulation
with probability at least 10−42n−3m−30, with  being the distance of the
voting rule from a dictatorship, n the number of non-manipulators, and m
the number of candidates.
Ariel Procaccia explored the idea of circumventing these results by con-
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sidering randomized voting rules [Pro10]. The idea here is to use a voting
rule that selects a winner randomly, where this randomly selected winner
will always have a score that is within a γ-fraction of the maximum score.
Such a voting rule is said to approximate the original voting rule with an
approximation ratio of γ. This method could be applied to any voting rule
that has a definable notion of score, and is not restricted merely to scoring
protocols. The argument for using such a voting rule is that the approxi-
mation will usually select an alternative that is optimal or nearly optimal,
and this approximation will be invulnerable to strategic voting.
It is important to note that the work Friedgut et al., Xia and Conitzer,
and Isaksson et al. are all based on the uniform distribution. Faliszewski,
Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe showed that many manipulation
problems known to be NP-hard in general fall down to P under a single-
peaked preference distribution [FHHR09].
1.1 Overview
The aim of this work is to further explore the practical difficulty of the ma-
nipulation problem. The empirical analysis will explore the manipulability
of elections over the uniform distribution, and two instances of the spatial
and Condorcet family of distributions.
Under the uniform distribution, all rankings of the candidates are equally
likely. We examine the uniform distribution because it is a natural an im-
partial distribution of votes, and it is commonly considered in other research
into manipulation as well.
The Condorcet family of distributions generate ballots that are biased
to put the candidates in one specific order, with a parameterized amount of
bias. The Condorcet distribution with p = 0.6 is examined for comparison
with the results in [CS06].
In the family of spatial distributions, every voter and every candidate has
a position on n orthogonal one-dimensional “issues.” Any particular voter
ranks the candidates by their euclidean distance from the voter in the n-
dimensional space formed by the issues, the nearest candidate being the most
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preferred. The spatial distribution is examined for several reasons. It seems
to model the perceived political landscape in many human populations, and
it is used in other empirical analyses of properties of voting rules and the
frequency at which they exhibit those properties [Cha85, CC78]. The spatial
distribution with a single dimension is actually the single-peaked model
mentioned earlier.
This work examines elections with three and five candidates. We examine
elections with number of non-manipulators equal to a power of two, from 1
to 128. We consider the manipulability of elections using the voting rules
plurality, plurality with two-candidate runoff, instant runoff voting (a.k.a.
single transferable vote, alternative vote, and Hare voting), the Borda count,
and veto.
The analysis uses a randomly generated election dataset. The imple-
mentation of the dataset generator, as well as the dataset itself and all code
written by this author for the analysis can be found in Appendix A.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
We will now provide definitions for the some of the terms and mathematical
structures to be used in the rest of this report, as well as background on
other topics addressed.
2.1 Elections
An election E is a set of candidates paired with a list of votes (C, V ). C
is the candidate set of the election. The number of candidates, |C|, is also
called m. When referring to specific candidates we will use letters a, b, and
c.
When not referring to specific candidates but rather candidates in gen-
eral, we’ll start at c and use letters c, d, and e. V is a list of votes cast by
voters. In this work we assume that each voter casts a single vote, and that
all the votes have equal weight. Thus the number of votes in the election’s
vote list is identical to the number of voters in the election, and is sometimes
written as n. We have not yet introduced the possibility of manipulation,
so none of these voters are part of any manipulating coalition. They cast
their votes according to their honest preferences of the candidates.
The voters are numbered from 1 to n. Because the voters do not take any
action beyond casting their vote, we may identify voters with their votes.
Each vote vi, the vote cast by voter i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is a total ordering over
15
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the candidates. Truncated ballots, i.e., ballots where the ranking stops after
listing some subset of the candidates, are not allowed, nor are ties in the
ranking, nor are expressions of relative strength of preference for candidates.
When referring to the relative position of candidates for a particular vote,
we may use the notation a >i b to indicate that a is ranked higher than b
on ballot vi.
An election is evaluated with a voting rule, called R, which produces a
subset of the candidates as a set of winners. Mathematically speaking, it is
a total function from a candidate set and a list of votes on that candidate
set to a subset of the candidate set. The candidates in this subset are
considered the winners of the election. If the winner set contains just a
single candidate, that candidate is the unique winner of the election. If
the winner set contains more than one candidate, they are all considered
non-unique winners of the election. In this work, we are interested only in
unique winners. Therefore, we consider any result set containing more than
one candidate to be the same as the empty set. If we discuss manipulators
making a candidate a winner, or say a candidate can be made to win, we
mean that the manipulators can make that candidate the unique winner in
at least one case. The set of possible winners is the set of all candidates such
that each one can separately be the unique winner under an appropriate set
of manipulator votes. An example can be found in Section 2.4.
In an election, the voting rule R is applied to C and V , and R(C, V ) gives
the winner set. It is generally desirable that the function R be computable
in polynomial time in the sizes of C and V . If R is not computable in
polynomial time, the winner of an election may not be determinable in
practice. While there has been some study of voting rules which are NP-hard
to compute and exploration of how often they are solvable [BTT89b, HH06],
in practical elections the voting rule must be polynomial-time computable.
Thus it is the case for all voting rules that are considered usable in practice
that they are computable in polynomial time, and hence we consider only
polynomial-time computable rules in this work.
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2.2 Voting Rules
This section gives definitions of the voting rules which are used in this report,
with related material.
Definition 2.1 (Pairwise Election). Given an election E and two candidates
a and b in the candidate set of E, a pairwise election between them considers
only the relative order of a and b on the votes in the vote set V , treating
all other candidates as if they were not part of the election. The candidate
that is higher on more ballots is the winner. A pairwise election may be a
tie. Voting rules that use pairwise elections in the process of determining a
winner will specify what occurs in the event of a tie.
Definition 2.2 (Voting Rules). Below are the definitions of the six voting
rules we analyze in this report. All of these rules as stated below have the
possibility of being tied. Since we are concerned only with unique winners
in this report, we do not consider any candidate a winner if there is a tie or
multiple winners.
• Under the Plurality rule, each candidate gets one point for each vote
putting that candidate in the first position. The candidate with the
greatest score is the winner.
• Instant runoff voting, a.k.a. single transferable vote, alternative vote,
and Hare voting, selects the winner through a series of rounds. In
each round, the candidate in the first position on the fewest number
of ballots is eliminated from further consideration. If more than one
candidate is tied for this dishonor, all such candidates are eliminated.
The remaining rounds proceed as if any eliminated candidates were not
in the candidate set nor in any of the votes. If any round eliminates
all remaining candidates, all the candidates remaining going into that
final round tie for the victory. If no ties occur, exactly one candidate
will remain after m− 1 rounds.
• Plurality with two-candidate runoff, a.k.a. plurality-with-runoff, oper-
ates in two rounds: the first round eliminates all but the two candi-
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dates who have the greatest number of first place votes, then applies
plurality to those remaining candidates to select the winner.
If more than two candidates are tied for most first place votes in the
first round, those candidates all advance. If two or more candidates
are tied for second-most first place votes in the first round, those can-
didates are all eliminated.
• The Borda count awards 0 points to the candidate in the lowest po-
sition on the ballot, 1 point to the next higher candidate, and so on,
with the candidate in the first position receiving m − 1 points. The
candidate with the highest sum score over all the votes is the winner.
• The Veto rule awards 1 point to all candidates not in last place on the
ballot. The candidate with the highest sum score over all the votes is
the winner. Alternately, each voter vetoes a single candidate, and the
candidate with the fewest vetoes is the winner.
• The winner under Copeland’s rule is the candidate with the most
points. Points are awarded based on pairwise elections. A win in a
pairwise election earns a candidate 1 point, a loss 0. The amount
awarded for a tie is parameterized. The most common is 12 point,
with 0 and 1 also being common alternatives, but any rational value
0 ≤ α ≤ 1 is allowed. Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Schnoor show
that for all values of α except 12 manipulation is NP-hard, even if the
number of manipulators is limited to 2 [FHS08, FHS10]. The difficulty
of manipulation for α = 12 is still unknown. In this work we used α =
1
2 ,
as it is the most common value seen in practice.
There is a generalization of some voting rules into a family called scor-
ing protocols. A rule in the family of scoring protocols is called a scoring
protocol.
Definition 2.3 (Scoring Protocol). A scoring protocol has a vector of point
values α of length equal to the size of the candidate set, with αi ≥ αi+1 for all
i. For each vote, each candidate receives points according their position on
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the ballot: the candidate in the ith position receives αi points (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
The candidate with the most points wins.
Plurality is a family of scoring protocols with scoring vector 〈1, 0, . . . , 0〉.
Veto is a family of scoring protocols with 〈1, 1, . . . , 1, 0〉. The Borda count
is a family of scoring protocols with 〈|C| − 1, |C| − 2, . . . , 0〉.
2.3 Election Distributions
The distribution from which instances are drawn is critical to an empirical
analysis.
Definition 2.4 (Probability Distribution). A probability distribution is a
function from a set of possible mutually-exclusive outcomes to a real-valued
probability of each outcome’s occurrence.
Alternatively, a probability distribution can be specified by a generation
function that makes use of a randomness-source. When such a generation
function is called it produces a representation of an outcome. Each outcome
is produced with probability according to the distribution function.
Here we specify the three distributions over election instances we will be
using to sample the election space by specifying their generation functions.
Each generation function used in this work takes a size parameters n and m
and generates an election from the set of all elections with n voters and m
candidates. Each of the distributions we examine draws each of the n votes
independently and distributed identically, and thus it suffices to specify an
election distribution by a generation function for a single vote.
The uniform distribution, also known as the impartial culture distri-
bution, is the simplest distribution. Each voter’s preferences are selected
uniformly from all possible permutations of the candidates.
The spatial distribution attempts to model the political landscape that
is thought to be seen in many human populations. A voter can be thought of
as a vector in a d-dimensional vector space, each candidate is also seen as a
vector in d-dimensional space, and the preferences of a voter are determined
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by sorting the candidates by their euclidean distance to the voter, nearest-
to-farthest. Each of the d dimensions is an issue in the election. Issues are
treated as orthogonal to one another. Furthermore, each coordinate in the
positions of each voter and each candidate are distributed according to a
normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 1.
The Condorcet distribution imagines that there is an intrinsic “true or-
der” for the candidates, and higher candidates are simply better than lower
candidates. Each vote drawn from this distribution is drawn using the fol-
lowing na¨ıve method: for each pair of candidates where a > b (a is in-
trinsically better than b), candidate a is ranked above candidate b on the
ballot with probability p, a parameter; with probability (1− p), b is ranked
higher than a. If at any time in this process a cycle is introduced, the vote
is discarded and the process starts over. Generating votes in this manner
is a time-consuming process because restarts occur frequently, especially
with more candidates and values of p closer to 0.5. Nevertheless, the na¨ıve
method was not prohibitively time-consuming for generating our data set.
The parameter p can be thought of as a level of noise each voter must con-
tend with in receiving the “true order.” Setting p to values 0.5 < p < 1 will
lead to the election being from slightly to extremely lop-sided. A value of
p = 0.5 degenerates to the uniform distribution.
2.4 Manipulation
All voters in the set V are non-manipulators. In manipulation, a coalition
of voters, called manipulators, coordinate in selecting the votes they cast, in
an attempt to get an outcome they prefer more than the natural outcome
that would have occurred if they had all voted their true preferences. We
may refer to the size of the manipulating coalition as k. The manipulators
cast a set of k votes. The set of their votes is denoted M .
For example, suppose an election has three candidates a, b, and c. The
non-manipulator votes V are 10 votes with a > b > c, and 8 votes with
b > a > c. Suppose the plurality rule is being used.
If there are k = 3 manipulators and their true preferences are c > b > a,
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and they vote honestly, their least preferred candidate, a, will win. They
would do better for themselves by voting b > c > a. Then b, a candidate
they prefer to a would win. For this non-manipulator vote set V and k = 3,
the set of possible winners is {a, b}. a is in the set because regardless of the
manipulators’ true preferences, a could be a unique winner for some set of
manipulator votes. If k were only 2, the manipulators could only get b to tie
with a. Since the set of possible winners contains only those candidates the
manipulators could make unique winners, the possible winner set for k = 2
is just {a}.
For manipulation in this work, the manipulators are a completely sep-
arate and distinguished group from the other voters in the election. If the
voters in the election number n, and the manipulators number k, there will
be a total of n+k votes passed into the voting rule. The set of votes passed
to the voting rule is V ∪M . We do not give the manipulators an explicit set
of true preferences. The true preferences mentioned in the above example
were for illustrative purposes. We are concerned only with the candidates in
the possible winner set. We assume that if the manipulators can calculate
the possible winner set, they can decide amongst themselves which candi-
date is the best choice—in the above example c could not be made a unique
winner, and b is their best option. It is interesting to observe that if different
members of the manipulating coalition have different true preferences over
the candidates, they may have to resort to an election amongst themselves
to decide who to manipulate for. Nevertheless, we do not concern ourselves
specifically with true preferences any further in this work.
The manipulators are assumed to have perfect knowledge of the non-
manipulators’ votes, and may use that knowledge to decide how to cast
their own votes. This is a commonly made assumption when investigating
the hardness of manipulation. Assuming perfect knowledge is the most fa-
vorable conceivable circumstance for the manipulators. Any results demon-
strated under this assumption must surely hold in less favorable conditions.
Conitzer and Sandholm use this model for Constructive-Coalitional-
Weighted-Manipulation in [CS02], for Constructive-Manipulation
in [CS03], and exclusively in [CS06]. We only consider constructive manip-
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ulation in this work. We do not consider destructive manipulation.
Other definitions are possible, like the one used by Chamberlin [Cha85].
In Chamberlin’s work, the manipulators are not a separate group, but in-
stead they are the subset of voters whose true preferences do not agree with
the result of the election computed using all the true preferences. These
are the voters who would be motivated to work for a different outcome.
In [EL05], Elkind and Lipmaa consider the manipulator (they only look at
coalitions of one) to be a member of the voting population (equivalent to V
here), and not in a separate group. Under this formulation, the manipula-
tion problem is similar to the problem of bribery. In bribery, it is asked if
one can select a group of voters from the existing voting population to bribe
into voting as the briber chooses, and thus swing the result of the election.
A fixed budget is given as part of the input, and the briber must select the
voters to bribe as well as their new voters. Bribery has forms that allow for
weighted voters, and voters with different bribery prices. Bribery of an elec-
tion using the plurality voting rule is in P, even if voters are given weights
or prices, but notably it becomes NP-complete if voters have weights and
prices.
We now define manipulation instances as we use them in this work.
Manipulation instances we examine come in several forms. All forms will
have a candidate set C, a set of non-manipulator votes V and a voting rule
R. There may also be a preferred candidate cp, an integer k, the size of the
manipulating coalition, or both. The votes that the manipulators eventually
cast is denoted as M . Since the votes are to be decided by the manipulating
coalition, M is not part of the input of any manipulation instances, but
rather refers to the votes the coalition eventually decides to cast.
Much of the literature does not consider the voting rule R to be part
of the input in a manipulation instance. Rather, manipulation is seen as a
family of problems, and manipulation for each rule is discussed separately
(e.g. Borda-manipulation, Copeland-manipulation, etc.). We have chosen
in this work to view R as part of the input, because the method we use to
solve manipulation instances is agnostic to which rule is actually used.
A manipulation instance with both cp and k, i.e., (C, V,R, cp, k), is a
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decision problem. Solving such an instance entails deciding whether or not
k manipulators can make cp a unique winner when voting rule R is applied
to V ∪M . An algorithm for solving such an instance may or may not give
a witnessing manipulator vote set.
If a manipulation instance does not give a preferred candidate, i.e., a ma-
nipulation instance (C, V,R, k), the task is to determine which candidates
in the candidate set can be made unique winners by k manipulators. In
other words, to compute the possible winner set. An algorithm for solving
this form of manipulation instance will return the subset of the candidates
W ⊆ C such that for each c ∈ W there exists a set of k manipulator votes
that makes c a unique winner. The algorithm may or may not give a wit-
nessing set of manipulator votes for each such candidate. Additionally, the
absence of a candidate c from W indicates that k manipulators cannot make
c become a unique winner. Examples of such algorithms include Greedy-
Manipulation from [BTT89a], and Find-Two-Winners from [CS06].
If a manipulation instance does not give a coalition size but does give
a preferred candidate, i.e., a manipulation instance (C, V,R, cp), the task
is to compute the minimum number of manipulators required make cp a
unique winner. Algorithms solving such instances will compute this mini-
mum value. We call this value the manipulation number for the candidate
cp with respect to the manipulation instance (C, V,R), or equivalently, the
minimum coalition size needed to make cp a unique winner.
If a manipulation instance specifies neither cp nor k, then the task is
to compute the manipulation numbers for each candidate c ∈ C. Recall
from before one of the primary questions we are evaluating is how often
can only one candidate be made to win, when exactly two, and when more.
Under reasonable assumptions about the voting rule which we will make
precise later, that question is asking for the manipulation numbers of the
candidates. The possible winner set of a manipulation instance (C, V,R, k)
contains exactly those candidates whose manipulation numbers with respect
to (C, V,R) are less than or equal to k. Moreover, we are not concerned with
the identities of the candidates, only the size of the possible winner set for
a given value of k. Thus, if we ignore the identities of the candidates, we
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can define the concept of manipulation numbers for a manipulation instance
(C, V,R).
Definition 2.5 (Manipulation numbers). The manipulation number of a
candidate c with respect to a manipulation instance (C, V,R) is the minimum
number of manipulators that are required to make c a unique winner of
(C, V,R).
The manipulation numbers for a manipulation instance (C, V,R), are a
sequence of m non-negative integers. The jth manipulation number (1 ≤
j ≤ m), is the minimum number of manipulators required to make the
possible winner set contain at least j candidates.
The jth manipulation number may be denoted as Mj .
Alternatively, if the jth manipulation number of the manipulation in-
stance (C, V,R) is k, then with k manipulators, at least j of the individual
candidates’ manipulation numbers with respect to (C, V,R) will be less than
or equal to k.
It what follows, when we refer to the manipulation number of a can-
didate, it will be assumed to be with respect to a manipulation instance
(C, V,R). Otherwise we mean the sequence of manipulation numbers for
the instance itself.
By examining manipulation instances of the form (C, V,R) in terms their
manipulation numbers, we can show some useful properties. As we have
defined manipulation numbers for candidates, there is currently no guarantee
that if k manipulators can make a candidate a unique winner, that k + 1
can as well.
Thus it would be helpful if our voting rules had the property mono-add-
top, defined by Woodall [Woo94]. It is a weaker form of the participation
criterion, i.e., participation implies mono-add-top. Mono-add-top can be
considered a relative of monotonicity as used by Arrow [Arr51] (Woodall
refers to that property as mono-raise). We reproduce a definition of mono-
add-top here.
Definition 2.6 (Mono-add-top). In an election (C, V ) with voting rule R,
R satisfies mono-add-top if whenever a candidate c is the unique winner
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of the election and additional ballots are added with c at the top and are
otherwise arbitrary, c remains the unique winner.
Strictly speaking, we do not require the full power of mono-add-top.
Mono-add-top requires all ballots with c at the top allow c to remain the
winner. All we need is a guarantee that there is some ballot that allows c to
remain the winner. It is quite conceivable that even with a voting rule that
does not satisfy mono-add-top, that the extra manipulators beyond the k
required could find a way to vote that preserves the unique winner. This
existential version of mono-add-top is clearly implied by regular mono-add-
top.
Definition 2.7 (Existential-mono-add). In an election (C, V ) with voting
rule R, R satisfies existential-mono-add if whenever a candidate c is the
unique winner of the election then there exists some way to cast an additional
ballot so that c remains the unique winner.
Using voting rules that satisfy at least existential-mono-add allows us
some liberty in our search for manipulation numbers. If we know that our
voting rules satisfy existential-mono-add, we have a guarantee that extra
manipulators beyond the minimum required cannot spoil a victory for a
candidate. We escape having to verify the existence of a set of ballots for
coalition sizes larger than the minimum, as well as having to check if a
smaller coalition is capable of manipulation if we have confirmed that a
larger one is not. The assumption of existential-mono-add allows us to use
a non-linear search technique to compute manipulation numbers. Without
assuming existential-mono-add, a search for manipulation numbers could
only proceed linearly, because any search that skips intermediate values
could not be sure of the optimality of any minimum it finds. For example,
if a search skips to 10 manipulators and finds that such a coalition cannot
make a certain candidate win, then with the assumption of existential-mono-
add, it also can be sure that no coalition smaller than 10 could make that
candidate win.
All the voting rules we examine in this work satisfy full mono-add-top,
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except Copeland which does not even satisfy existential-mono-add.1 For
scoring protocols, it is obvious that since a unique winner holds the top
score, adding additional ballots with that candidate at the top increases its
score by at least as much as that of any other candidate. Woodall shows
instant runoff voting (known as “alternative vote” in that work) satisfies
mono-add-top [Woo94].
Plurality with two-candidate runoff satisfies it as long as candidates that
are tied for second-most first-place votes in the first round are eliminated
(which is how we have defined it in this work). Suppose candidate is already
winning. Consider each of the possible score situations. If the candidate
leads with multiple candidates tied for second place, all those candidates
will still be eliminated if an extra point goes to the preferred candidate. If
the candidate leads just one other candidate and wins after the transfers,
adding a point to the candidate’s score can’t change who is eliminated in the
first round, so the same transfers make the preferred candidate win. If the
candidate shares the lead with one other candidate and again wins on trans-
fers, then again the extra point cannot change the eliminated candidates,
and the preferred candidate will remain the winner. If the candidate shares
the lead with more than one other candidate, the extra point will cause the
preferred candidate to win immediately. Finally, if the candidate trails one
other candidate and wins on transfers, the extra point again cannot change
the eliminations. If candidates tied for second are allowed to advance, then
1Consider the election
a > b > c > d > v
a > c > v > d > b
d > a > b > c > v
d > a > c > b > v
b > c > d > a > v
c > b > d > a > v
a is currently the unique winner with three pairwise victories. b has one victory and two
ties, c and d each have two victories and one tie, and v has no victories. Any additional
ballot cast will break the ties between b and c, and b and d, resulting in an overall tie
between a and one of b, c, or d.
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the extra first round point can change the first-round eliminations and vio-
late the mono-add-top.
Though Copeland does not satisfy existential-mono-add, we nevertheless
found that a vast majority of elections generated according to the distribu-
tions described previously allowed additional manipulators to find appropri-
ate additional ballots that would let a winning candidate remain a winner.
Theorem 2.1 (Non-reversion of manipulation for candidates). If the manip-
ulation number for a candidate c is k, and the voting rule satisfies existential-
mono-add, then for all manipulating coalitions of size k′ > k, that coalition
can also make c a unique winner.
Proof. The first k manipulators can cast exactly the same ballots that they
did to make c a unique winner and existential-mono-add guarantees the
existence of ballots that the extra manipulators (k′− k of them) can cast to
keep c a unique winner.
The next theorem establishes that the manipulation numbers for a ma-
nipulation instance do not decrease, and does not depend on mono-add-top.
This property is used to save effort when we compute the full sequence of
manipulation numbers for manipulation instances in the next chapter by
allowing us to begin searches for subsequent manipulation numbers using
the previous value as a lower bound.
Theorem 2.2 (Non-decreasing manipulation numbers for manipulation in-
stances). The manipulation numbers for any manipulation instance (C, V,R)
are a non-decreasing sequence. Equivalently, if Mj for (C, V,R) is k, then
Mj−1 is at most k.
Proof. If the Mj = k, then the k manipulators can also make j−1 candidates
unique winners. Thus, Mj−1 is at most k.
We can reexamine Conitzer and Sandholm’s work on the frequency at
which elections are manipulable in the context of manipulation numbers.
First, Conitzer and Sandholm discard manipulation instances for which only
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one candidate can be made to win. This is equivalent to discarding all in-
stances for which the second manipulation number exceeds the size of the
manipulating coalition. They remark that these instances are not interest-
ing. In one sense this is true: When the goal is to highlight for a given k
the ratio of instances for which M2 ≤ k to those for which k < M3, then
indeed they are not interesting. But a broader examination of how often
manipulation is hard for the coalition should include these cases. Indeed, if
k < M2, manipulation is not merely hard but impossible! Surely one must
consider these cases.
Manipulation numbers are also interesting in another sense. In a way,
they form a universal scoring system for elections. Some voting rules pro-
duce a score that conveniently summarizes an election, illustrating a margin
of victory for a winner and how far each losing candidate was behind the
winner. Scoring protocols and Copeland’s rule are examples of rules that
produce such a score. For some voting rules it is more difficult to summarize
how well a losing candidate performed. Instant runoff voting, plurality-with-
runoff, and the Schulze method [Sch03] are examples of rules that do not
have a convenient score. Additionally, some definitions of criteria for voting
rules are expressed more conveniently when the rule produces a score. A
property known as weak monotonicity given in [CS06] is one such example.
There, Conitzer and Sandholm phrase monotonicity for scoring protocols
as “if a manipulator changes his vote so that a given candidate is ranked
ahead of a larger set of candidates, then that candidate’s score should not
decrease.” The general definition they give later is more complex.
Manipulation numbers can be used to provide a score to any candidate
under any voting rule: The score is the minimum number of extra voters
that would have to be added to unambiguously swing the election for a
given candidate. Although they would have to vote ideally, it does provide
a well-defined way for the additional voters to vote that has an intuitive
rationale.
For example, in an election being decided by the instant runoff voting
rule, one possible way of evaluating the losing candidates’ performance or
ranking the candidates would be to consider the elimination order when the
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rule is executed. Consider an election with seven votes for a > b > c, four
for a > c > b, nine for b > a > c, and 10 for c > a > b. In this election, b is
eliminated first. The votes transfer to a, c is eliminated, and a wins. The
ranking by elimination order is a (the non-eliminated winner), then c, and
lastly b. However, both b and c can win with just four manipulators.2 The
manipulating coalitions would cast votes to raise their preferred candidate’s
count of first-place votes to 12, and then tie the other two candidates’ first-
place counts at 11. Both of the other candidates are eliminated together, and
the coalition’s preferred candidate wins. In this sense, b and c are actually
tied.
This particular example highlights a disappointing property of instant
runoff voting under the ties-eliminate model. In constructing the above ex-
ample, we found that the most effective strategy for manipulating coalitions
in instant runoff voting elections with the ties-eliminate model was to raise
their candidate above the pack and force a tie among the other candidates.
The transfer effect and candidates’ support in non-first-place positions rarely
had to be considered.
This possible application of manipulation as a scoring and summary
mechanism is also another reason in support of the assumption of perfect
information: Solving manipulation instances may not be an attack under-
taken by malicious agents but rather a part of a post-election analysis to
summarize candidate performances when the rule does not readily provide
a convenient summary or score.
2Four was verified as the minimum coalition size for both candidates by our software,
described in the next chapter.

Chapter 3
Computation of
Manipulation Numbers
The primary contribution of this work to the field is an empirical analysis
of the practical difficulty of manipulation. To aid in the empirical analysis,
we used software techniques capable of computing the exact manipulation
numbers of manipulation instances. For the purpose of this work we were
not interested in the specific votes that the manipulators should cast to
make a candidate win, and so as implemented we do not output the votes,
but all the techniques we employ would be perfectly capable of producing
the actual manipulator votes with only minor modification.
In the following sections we illustrate the techniques we used for com-
puting manipulation numbers for a manipulation instance (C, V,R).
We give a procedure that will compute all the manipulation numbers
for a manipulation instance (C, V,R) given an algorithm for computing the
possible winner set for an instance (C, V,R, k).
Recall that the possible winner set is the set of all candidates who each
separately could be made into a unique winner through the action of k ma-
nipulators. Each technique for computing the possible winner set is used
as a black box in the procedure which computes manipulation numbers for
(C, V,R). We chose to consider the methods of computing the possible win-
ner set as a black box because there are numerous ways to either compute
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or approximate the possible winner set of an instance (C, V,R, k), such as
Bartholdi et al.’s Greedy-Manipulation [BTT89a], Conitzer and Sand-
holm’s Find-Two-Winners [CS06], the techniques presented here, as well
as any others yet to be discovered.
We give two procedures that will compute the solution to the decision
instance (C, V,R, cp, k) (that is “Can cp be made the unique winner of the
election through the action of k manipulators?”). Each of these procedures
is run on each candidate in C, to compute the possible winner set for an
instance (C, V,R, k).
3.1 Manipulation-Numbers and Find-First
The following procedure computes the manipulation numbers for (C, V,R)
using as a black box subroutine a procedure for computing the possible
winner set from a manipulation instance (C, V,R, k).
Manipulation-Numbers(C, V,R)
1 N ← 〈〉
2 k ← 0
3 for i← 1 to m
4 k ← Find-First(i, 0, 0)
5 Append k to N as the ith manipulation number.
6 return N
I-Winners(i, k)
1 return |Possible-Winners(C, V,R, k)| ≥ i
The procedure Find-First is a search procedure. It is a variation of
binary search that searches for the first value k for which a predicate function
is satisfied. As used here, it takes a parameter i which is passed through
to the predicate I-Winners, an initial value to begin searching from, and a
step size which is always zero for the top-level call.
The predicate function, in addition to receiving the parameter i (which
remains the same throughout the tree of calls that implement a single
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search), takes a single integer, and returns true or false. The Find-First
procedure assumes that there is some integer k for which all inputs to the
predicate less than k return false, and all inputs greater than or equal to
k return true. If the predicate satisfies these assumptions, the Find-First
procedure finds this value k, the first value that makes the predicate return
true. For computing manipulation numbers, if the voting rule in use sat-
isfies mono-add-top then we know that the size of the possible winner set
never decreases as k is increased, so Find-First’s requirement holds: there
is some value (the ith manipulation number) below which the predicate will
return false (there are fewer than i winners), and at or above this value the
predicate will return true (there are i or more winners).
One feature of Find-First that distinguishes it from standard binary
search is that Find-First does not require a known upper bound. It es-
tablishes an upper bound by evaluating the predicate at successively larger
values, doubling the argument in each successive step. While we do in tech-
nically have an upper bound in this case, namely the point where the ma-
nipulators outnumber the non-manipulators, Find-First does not directly
make use of that. That fact is used however by the Possible-Winners
function—it returns all candidates as possible winners when the number of
manipulators exceeds the number of non-manipulators.
Find-First also has the advantage in this application of tending to
search smaller values first. This is advantageous when it is expected that
smaller values of the predicate are quicker to compute, which we is the
case here, and when the value that the predicate will return tends toward
the lower end of any given interval, i.e., there is a higher probability that
the value returned will be small. When computing manipulation numbers
for elections generated under the uniform distribution, using Find-First
rather than binary search between 0 and n+ 1 led to instances being solved
in roughly five to fifteen percent less time. For elections drawn from the
Condorcet and spatial distributions, the advantage was less distinct, but
was not a hindrance.
Our software implementation made extensive use of caching wherever
possible. Not only were the results of the predicate cached, but some eval-
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uations of the predicate were eliminated entirely by using the assumption
of mono-add-top in our voting rules. If in the search for minimum manipu-
lation numbers a decision problem was evaluated, e.g., “Can a coalition of
eight make a candidate a unique winner?” and later the search needed to
decide if a coalition of size 10 could make that same candidate a unique win-
ner, the caching mechanism would report in the affirmative without solving
another potentially expensive decision problem, because a smaller coalition
was already shown to be capable of this task. Similarly, if a given coalition
was shown to be unable to make a candidate a unique winner, a smaller
coalition was automatically assumed to be likewise unable to make to make
that candidate a unique winner.
Find-First(i, k, step)
1 if I-Winners(i, k)
2 return 0
3 if I-Winners(i, k + step)
4 return b step2 c+ Find-First(i, k + b step2 c, 0)
5 return Find-First(i, k,max(1, 2 · step))
Find-First operates recursively. It assumes that once it has evaluated
the predicate at a particular value, evaluating that value again is a fast
operation, i.e., that the result is automatically memoized. The return value
of any single call to Find-First is the offset from the parameter k of the
lowest value to satisfy the predicate. The initial value of k in the call from
Manipulation-Numbers is 0. If the predicate holds for 0, it returns 0. The
procedure maintains the invariant that if the value k satisfies the predicate,
it is the lowest value to do so. If k does not satisfy the predicate, it begins
to search offsets from k of successive powers of two until it finds a value
that satisfies the predicate. The value of the search offset is passed in the
parameter step. When it finds a satisfying value, it begins the search again,
with k advanced to the last value seen that does not satisfy the predicate,
namely b step2 c, and step set to 0. When the recursive stack unwinds, the
value of each frame’s last unsatisfying search offset is added into a running
sum. The end result of this sum is the lowest value to satisfy the predicate.
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As an example of the operation of Find-First, if the smallest coali-
tion size that can make a candidate win is 23, Find-First would evaluate
the predicate for values of k = 0, 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 17, 18, 20, 24, 21, 22, 24, 23.
Note how the search operates by doubling the offset from the last known
lower bound, and resetting the offset each time a satisfying value is found.
Find-First evaluates the predicate at 14 different values. A linear search
would have evaluated 24. A standard binary search would need an upper
bound to operate. If this election has, say, 128 non-manipulators, we can
use an upper bound on the coalition size of 129. Binary search would have
evaluated the predicate at 65, 33, 17, 26, 22, 24, 23. At first, this appears
more efficient. However, this sequence includes the value 65, which could
be prohibitively expensive to compute. Find-First on this example never
searches a value greater than 32. Also note that 24 appears in the list twice.
The caching behavior in our implementation meant that the predicate was
only evaluated at 24 once.
A bigger problem for binary search is what happens when the predicate
cannot be evaluated within a given time limit. Because some instances of
the predicate cannot be solved within a reasonable time limit, we attempt
to find lower and upper bounds for manipulation numbers. We do this by
running two separate searches. In the first search, if the predicate is not
solved within the time limit, we assume that it returns true. In the second
search, we assume it returns false. The result of this is that the two search
procedures will give lower and upper bounds on the manipulation numbers,
respectively. Previously, we assumed that the predicate always returned
false up to a value k, then always returned true. When a time limit is
added, this changes. Now, the predicate will return false up to a point,
then there will be a region where instances will not be solvable within the
time limit, followed by the region where it returns true. By assuming that
the unknown region is false, the search procedure finds the first value for
which the predicate is definitely known to be true. By assuming true in the
unknown region, it finds the first value at which it could be true. These
values form upper and lower bounds respectively on manipulation numbers.
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Binary search when applied to larger instances where there was a larger
unknown region would attempt to evaluate the predicate at more values in
the unknown region. Since the unknown region is by definition the set of
problem instances where the maximum allowable time limit was used, as a
result, it performed worse overall in our experiments because of the amount
of time it spent on harder instances that Find-First avoided. This more
than offset the small amount of time gained on smaller instances.
3.2 Brute force
The simplest technique we used to solve decision manipulation instances
(C, V,R, cp, k) was a na¨ıve brute force search over all possible manipulator
vote multisets. We enumerated every possible multiset of manipulator votes,
then combined each such multiset with the votes of the non-manipulating
voters and applied the voting rule to the combined set of votes. The ma-
nipulator votes were enumerated by enumerating all lists of m! non-negative
elements that sum to k. We enumerated these lists with a variation of in-
teger partitions [KS98]. Unlike standard integer partitions where the parts
are strictly non-increasing and zeros are disallowed, the order of the parts
of the partition was retained, zero was allowed as a valid element of the
partitions, and we ensured each partition had m! entries.
The following pseudo-code procedure generates all the distinct lists of
m! non-negative elements that sum to k. These lists correspond precisely to
the set of all the possible ways k manipulators could cast their ballots for
m candidates.
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Manipulator-Votes(k, length)
1 if k = 0
2 return {〈0, 0, . . . , 0〉}  list has length elements.
3 if length = 1
4 return {〈k〉}
5 x← ∅
6 for c← 0 to k
7 x′ ←Manipulator-Votes(k − c, length −1)
8 for i← 0 to |x′| − 1
9 Place c onto the front of x′i
10 x← x ∪ x′
11 return x
The parameter k is the value each returned list should sum to, and is
also the number of manipulator votes that remain undetermined at each
recursive step. The parameter length is the how long the resulting lists
should be. For the first call, its value is m!, giving a list that has one entry
for each lexicographic permutation of the candidates. Each resulting list is
interpreted as a set of manipulator votes.
The above function has two base cases. When the number of undeter-
mined manipulator votes is zero, all remaining positions in the list are filled
with zeros. When the length parameter gets down to one, meaning there
is only one entry in the list undetermined, the returned list has a single
entry containing all the remaining manipulator votes. After checking for
base cases, the recursive case is executed. For each possible number of ma-
nipulator votes to be assigned to the next position, c, the procedure calls
itself recursively and gets the set of all lists having c fewer manipulator votes
(since it is about to assign c of them to the current position), and one fewer
position to be filled. c is then attached to the front of each list returned by
the recursive call. All values of c from 0 to all of the remaining manipulators
are valid values for the current entry of the list. If we were computing the
answer to an instance (C, V,R, cp, k) where k = 4 and m = |C| = 3, the
above procedure would be called with k = 4 and length = m! = 6, and
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it would give a set of lists. Each list would have six non-negative integer
elements, and each list would sum to four. Each list would represent one
way the manipulators could vote.
The ith integer in each final list in the returned set corresponds to the
number of times that the ith lexicographical permutation of the candidates
should be included as a vote. We used a simple combinatorial unrank
procedure from [KS98] to get a specified lexicographic permutation of a set
of objects. The parameter objects is initially a list of the candidates in some
distinguished initial order. The parameter rank specifies which lexicographic
permutation of the candidates we want.
unrank(objects, rank)
1 if | objects | = 1
2 return objects
3 position ← b rankb c
4 b← (| objects | − 1)!
5 rest ← unrank(tail(objects), rank mod b)
 Tail returns its argument with the first element removed.
6 Return rest with objects[0] inserted at index position.
Using the example from above with k = 4 and m = 3, one of the lists
in the returned set would be 〈1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1〉, and it would correspond to the
set of votes {a > b > c, b > a > c, b > c > a, c > b > a}—one vote each in
each of the first, third, fourth, and sixth lexicographic permutations of the
candidates.
To compute the possible winner set, we applied the voting rule to the
concatenation of the non-manipulators’ votes and each possible multiset of
manipulator votes. If the rule produced a unique winner, it was added to the
possible winner set. The procedure Make-Votes takes as parameters the
candidate set and one of the lists produced by Manipulator-Votes, and
prepares a multiset of votes by adding list j instances of the jth lexicographic
permutation of the candidates.
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Possible-Winners-By-Brute-Force(C, V,R, k)
1 winners ← ∅
2 votes ←Manipulator-Votes(k, |C|!)
3 for i← 0 to | votes | − 1
4 M ←Make-Votes(C, votes i)
5 W ← R(C, V ∪M)
6 if |W | = 1
7 winners ← winners ∪W
8 return winners
Any election that produced multiple winners was treated as having no
winner, as this work only concerns manipulators making a candidate the
unique winner. We stored the running set of candidates for which the
search had found a set of manipulator votes that could make that candi-
date a unique winner. The set of unique winners seen after examining all
the manipulator vote profiles was taken as the set of possible winners. As
a time-saving measure not illustrated in the code above, the process was
stopped early whenever the set of possible unique winners contained all
the candidates. This naturally implies the process was never stopped early
when some candidates could not be made unique winners by the efforts of
the manipulators.
This technique was deliberately na¨ıve. It represented the simplest pos-
sible method that would yield a correct answer. It was useful to get a
baseline for comparison of the efficiency of other techniques, and also to test
the correctness of our implementation of other techniques.
3.3 Reductions and state-of-the-art solvers
Our main alternative method for computing the possible winner set for ma-
nipulation instances (C, V,R, k) works by computing the answers to each
element of the set of m decision problems {(C, V,R, c, k) | c ∈ C}. We
solved these decision problems by reducing them to other problems which
are better understood in the literature, namely 0–1 integer programming and
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CNF-SAT. CNF-SAT was the first problem shown to be NP-complete, by
Cook [Coo71]. Shortly after, 0–1 integer programming was shown to be NP-
complete by Karp as one of his twenty-one NP-complete problems [Kar72].
0–1 integer programming is a special case of integer linear programming
where the values of the variables are restricted to 0 or 1. Integer linear
programming is also NP-complete, and is often used as a reduction target
for other NP-complete problems [Pap81, WN99]. If the variables are not
restricted to the integers, the problem is known as linear programming.
Linear programming is not NP-complete and efficient techniques for solving
linear programs are well-studied [Mur83].
An instance of integer linear programming consists of a set of inequalities
in several variables, often denoted as a series xi. The inequalities are all
linear in the variables xi—they consist of a sum of terms on the left side,
and a constant on the right side, and each term includes only one variable to
the first power, multiplied by a constant coefficient. The inequalities have
the general form ∑
i
ai · xi ≤ b
The instance asks if there is an assignment of integer values to the variables
xi that satisfies all of the inequalities. A simple example of an integer linear
program would be the set of inequalities
2x1 ≤ 9
−x1 ≤ −3
There exists a solution to this set of inequalities at, e.g., x1 = 4, so the
instance is satisfiable.
Some definitions of integer linear programming allow requiring the min-
imization or maximization of some objective, e.g., find an assignment of
the variables that satisfies all of the inequalities and for which the value of
x1 is minimized over all satisfying assignments. In the above example, the
minimized solution is x1 = 3. Since our problems are decision problems,
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we are not interested in minimization or maximization, only whether or not
the instances are satisfiable. In the reductions we have come up with for
the decision instances, we do not need the variables of the inequalities to
assume any value other than 0 or 1.
CNF-SAT is a decision problem that asks “Given a Boolean formula
in conjunctive normal form, is there an assignment of truth values to the
variables of the formula that makes the entire formula true?” A Boolean
formula in conjunctive normal form is a single conjunction of disjuncts. Each
disjunct is a set of disjoined literals, and each literal is either a variable or
the negation of a variable.
CNF-SAT is a special case of 0–1 integer programming. One can see this
by letting the variables of the CNF-SAT formula correspond with variables
in 0–1 integer programming. Each conjunct c becomes the inequality∑
`∈c
coeff(`) · var(`) ≥ 1−#negated literals in c
where coeff(`) is −1 if ` is a negated literal and 1 otherwise, and var(`)
is a 0–1 integer programming variable corresponding to the variable in `.
The conjunction of the disjuncts in CNF-SAT is mirrored by the require-
ment in 0–1 integer programming that all the inequalities be simultaneously
satisfied.
As an example of this equivalence, consider the CNF-SAT formula
¬x2 ∨ x4
¬x3 ∨ ¬x6
According to the above transformation, this yields the inequalities
−x2 + x4 ≥ 0
−x3 − x6 ≥ −1
Under this scheme there is a direct correspondence between CNF-SAT
variables and 0–1 integer programming variables. For convenience in writing
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the reductions, we sometimes use the notation of CNF-SAT alongside the
notation for 0–1 integer programming. Thus, we may choose to write
x1 + x2 + x3 − x4 − x5 − x6 ≤ 0
¬x2 ∨ x4
¬x3 ∨ ¬x6
This should be clearer than if the second two forms were written as the
inequalities −x2 + x4 ≥ 0 and −x3− x6 ≥ −1. In either case, it is seen that
there is no real change in the problem being hidden by notation.
We selected 0–1 integer programming as a reduction target because it
seemed particularly well-suited for constructing reductions from the manip-
ulation problems for the voting rules we examine. Manipulation for vot-
ing rules we examined can all be phrased conveniently using constraints
allowed in 0–1 integer programming and CNF-SAT. This combination of
0–1 integer programming and Satisfiability is sometimes called pseudo-
Boolean satisfiability, or pseudo-Boolean optimization. For example, plu-
rality voting can be expressed as a collection of inequalities, one for every
candidate other than the one the manipulators prefer, each asserting that
the number of first-place votes the preferred candidate received is strictly
greater than the number for the other candidate. The number of first-place
votes a candidate received is computed from an encoding of the ballots.
If Fv,c is a variable representing that voter v put candidate c in first posi-
tion (F for first position), comparing the number of first place votes for two
candidates a and b and ensuring that a has more than b is a single inequality∑
v∈V
Fv,a −
∑
v∈V
Fv,b ≥ 1
Our encoding of the ballots for manipulation of plurality voting (and of
all scoring protocols) has a variable for each candidate-ballot pair that is 1
iff that candidate is in the first position on that ballot (as well as variables
for the other positions). The votes for the non-manipulators are specified
by adding single literal clauses to set the truth value of the variables rep-
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resenting their votes. The manipulators’ ballots are left free to be solved
by the solver, but constraints are placed upon them to make sure the solver
does not assign illegal ballots to the manipulators in its search for an assign-
ment to the variables. It is here that expressing elements of the reductions
as CNF-SAT is handy. Many of these constraints take the form of simple
implications, and it would be awkward to write these constraints only in
inequalities.
Here is an example of one such set of constraints placed on the manip-
ulator ballots. If a voter has a candidate in first-place, no other candidate
can be in first place. ∧
v∈V
c,d∈C,c6=d
Fv,c → ¬Fv,d
Although manipulation for plurality voting is trivial, it demonstrates the
convenience of using 0–1 integer programming with CNF-SAT notation as a
reduction target. We find that many voting rules incorporate operations like
taking sums of variables, and constraining the possible values of the sums
with inequalities. Thus we expect that 0–1 integer programming would be
a useful target for constructing reductions for other voting rules that we do
not examine.
After manipulation instances were reduced to 0–1 integer programming
problems, we solved them using state-of-the-art solvers for integer linear
programming and CNF-SAT. To get CNF-SAT instances from 0–1 integer
programming instances we used a reduction described by Warners [War98].
This reduction is described in Section 3.3.2.
Our initial motivation for exploring reductions was to allow the solving of
manipulation instances by state-of-the-art solvers. Since the main concern
of this work is to explore the practical difficulty of manipulation, state-
of-the-art solvers were a natural choice, as they represent the culmination
of great amounts of research into solving these well-known NP-complete
problems efficiently [DP60, DLL62, BHZ06]. State-of-the-art solvers are
capable of solving instances far beyond the range of tractability of a brute
force search [LZD04]. Moreover, the state-of-the-art in these well-known
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problems continues to develop, so reductions that target these problems will
inherit progress made in solver research. There is an annual conference on
practical applications of Satisfiability [SS10], that has in recent years
been accompanied by a competition between Satisfiability solvers to see
which can solve the most instances from a battery of large instances, and
minimize the time they take to do so [SP08, BRS09].
By reducing to 0–1 integer programming and CNF-SAT we were able to
solve larger instances than would have been possible using only a brute force
method. We observed that when computing manipulation numbers, solvers
were able to quickly determine unsatisfiability for manipulation instances
with few manipulators, and to quickly show satisfiability for manipulation
instances with many more manipulators than the minimum needed to make
a candidate a unique winner. We observed there was a core of instances
where the number of manipulators was close to the minimum needed where
the instances grew very difficult to solve, growing harder for the solvers to
solve closer to the exact minimum. While some of the instances were not
solvable within a given time limit, if one is willing to accept an approxi-
mation, our technique of computing manipulation numbers gives an upper
and a lower bound for manipulation numbers which could not be exactly
computed within the time limit, and the precision of these estimates can be
increased by increasing the time limit.
Our system of reducing manipulation problems to 0–1 integer program-
ming and CNF-SAT is capable of producing an actual set of manipulator
votes that would make the preferred candidate win when such a set of votes
exists, i.e., it can produce the witnessing set of votes (not merely assert
that they exist) as long as the solver used produces a satisfying model for
instances it determines to be satisfiable.
It is also relatively simple to add support for additional voting rules.
The details of the voting rule need only be constructed using a number of
easily-combined constructs we have written for describing voting rules in
CNF-SAT. We have these common, easily-combined voting rule constructs
defined in our software, which we describe in Section 3.3.4.
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3.3.1 State-of-the-art solvers used
We used the GNU Linear Programming Kit [Mak] to solve 0–1 integer pro-
gramming instances, and Clasp [GKS10] to solve CNF-SAT instances. The
GNU Linear Programming Kit was used because it was a freely available
0–1 integer programming solver. Clasp was selected for its gold-medal per-
formance in the crafted category in the 2009 SAT competition [BRS09].
One may wonder why we look at both 0–1 integer programming and
CNF-SAT as final targets for our reductions. It would initially seem that
the reduction to 0–1 integer programming is more direct, and yields smaller
problems with far fewer total constraints. Intuition would also seem to
suggest that being able to use the hardware adders on a CPU would give
an advantage to a 0–1 integer programming solver over a CNF-SAT solver
that is implementing adders via constraints in the formula. However Li et
al. have shown that Satisfiability solvers can be very efficient at solving
integer programming problems [LZD04].
To compare the GNU Linear Programming Kit and the CNF-SAT
solvers, we reduced manipulation problems to CNF-SAT by applying Warn-
ers’ reduction to the 0–1 integer programming elements, and also reduced
the same instances to 0–1 integer programming by converting the CNF-
SAT elements to 0–1 integer programming. In these early experiments,
Clasp applied to the CNF-SAT forms far outperformed the GNU Linear
Programming Kit on the 0–1 integer programming forms, by at least an
order of magnitude. A possible explanation for this is that some of the con-
straints resulting from reducing manipulation yielded problems that had a
large number of implications. All the reductions use many implications to
specify what is a valid vote for a manipulator to cast—if some condition is
true about a ballot (a candidate is given a certain rank) then another con-
dition must be false (no other candidates may be given that rank). When
these are converted to inequalities, the implications may not be as read-
ily detectable by the solver. Similarly, other parts of the reductions are
very readily expressed as logical Boolean formulas, and comparatively fewer
parts were expressed as inequalities. While reducing inequalities to CNF-
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SAT may seem more awkward, more of the constraints were expressed as
Boolean formulas. These factors probably lead to Clasp performing far
better on these problems than the GNU Linear Programming Kit. This ex-
planation agrees with the observations of Manquinho et al. in [MMSOS98],
that 0-1 integer programs where the models are very hard to satisfy presents
trouble for branch-and-bound based solvers, as they can enter branches of
the search tree where the model is not satisfiable at all and they take too
long to determine this and back out.
3.3.2 A reduction from 0–1 integer programming to CNF-
SAT
As stated previously, our manipulation instances may contain both CNF-
SAT clauses and 0–1 integer programming inequalities. To arrive at a sin-
gle formula that is only CNF-SAT, the inequalities must be turned into
CNF-SAT formulas. We now present the technique we used to turn the
0–1 integer programming inequalities in our manipulation instances into
CNF-SAT formulas.
To turn 0–1 integer programming intoCNF-SAT, we need to convert the
inequalities into Boolean formulas that have the same meaning. We did this
by using the transformation described by Warners [War98], which produces
a formula that is linear in the number of summands in the inequality.
Warners’ transformation begins by computing the sum of the left side of
the inequality. Computing the sum of the left side begins with computing the
value of each summand. Observe that each summand is actually a coefficient
multiplied with a variable, and that variable is restricted to 0 or 1. The left
side has the form ∑
i
ai · xi
Each summand ai · xi is represented by a vector of CNF-SAT variables,
representing the binary encoding of the integral value of the result of the
multiplication. Let zi be the vector of variables representing the value of
the ith term.
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The truth values of the zi vector are uniquely determined by the value of
ai and the truth value of variable xi. The value of ai is known at reduction
time, but the value of xi is not. There are only two possible states for xi,
and hence there are only two possible states for the entire vector zi. If xi is
false, all variables for in the vector are false, making the summand zero. If
xi is true, those variables corresponding to bits that are true in the binary
representation of the integer coefficient ai are true, and the others are false,
giving the summand the value of ai. For example, if the value of ai is 9,
with the binary representation 10012, the resulting formula would force zi,1
and Zi,2 to be false always, and zi,0 and zi,3 to be true if and only if xi is
true. Thus, the formula would contain
¬zi,0 ∨ xi
zi,0 ∨ ¬xi
¬zi,1
¬zi,2
¬zi,3 ∨ xi
zi,3 ∨ ¬xi
If ai is negative, a simple algebraic manipulation is employed to make an
equivalent inequality with only positive coefficients. For any negative ai, |ai|
is used in its place, |ai| is added to the value of the right side of the inequality,
and xi is replaced with ¬xi. For example, the inequality −3x0+−7x1+x2 ≤
0 is equivalent to 3(¬x0) + 7(¬x1) + x2 ≤ 10.
After the “multiplication” step, there are now several vectors of literals,
each one encoding an integer that is part of the left side sum. Warners’
transformation implements a binary adder for each pair of summands, and
the result is another collection of variable vectors, now representing the sum
of pairs of terms. This process of adding pairs is repeated until there is a
single vector of variables encoding the sum of the entire left side. If there
are an odd number of terms in any of these rounds, the case is handled by
leaving the unpaired term unchanged, and carrying it forward into the next
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round.
The final comparison between the sum of the left side of the inequality
and the value on the right side of the inequality is performed with a binary
less-than-or-equal-to operation. Since the inequalities are defined to have a
constant on the right side, and the adder structure from the left side ends
with the sum of the left-hand side as a binary-encoded integer in a vector
of variables, the comparison constraint merely has to assert that the latter
vector encodes a value less than or equal to the former vector.
For convenience, let us call the left side vector x and the right side vector
y. Observe that if x > y, then for some bit position k, the kth bit of x is
true, while the kth bit of y is false and there is no more significant bit
position where the opposite relation holds, i.e., there is no j > k (bit j is
more significant than bit k) such that the jth bit of x is false, while the jth
bit of y is true. Thus, to assert that x ≤ y, we assert for any bit position
that is true in x and false in y that there must be a more significant bit
position that is false in x and true in y. To show it more succinctly in
conjunctive normal form, we borrow a piece of notation used by Warners
when describing the constraint. Let By be the set of bit indices in y that
are true. All indices are assumed to be between 0 and the length of the bit
vector representing each number, so that they are valid indices.
∧
k 6∈By
¬xk ∨ ∨
j∈By ,j>k
¬xj

3.3.3 Embedding nested constraints
We also employ in our reductions the well-known technique of converting a
general Satisfiability formula into a CNF-SAT formula that is equisat-
isfiable. For example, the non-CNF formula
(x1 ∧ y1) ∨ (x2 ∧ y2)
may be converted into a CNF-SAT formula by introducing a new surro-
gate variable for each sub-expression which is in conjunctive normal form,
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and forcing this variable to be logically equivalent to its associated sub-
expression. This is known as a Tseitin transformation or reifying the ex-
pression [Tse68, BHZ06].
In this example, we would introduce S1 for x1 ∧ y1 and S2 for x2 ∧ y2,
then add clauses to the formula to make them logically equivalent, yielding
the formula
S1 ∨ S2
S1 ↔ (x1 ∧ y1)
S2 ↔ (x2 ∧ y2)
which can be reduced to the CNF-SAT formula
S1 ∨ S2
¬S1 ∨ x1
¬S1 ∨ y1
¬x1 ∨ ¬y1 ∨ S1
¬S2 ∨ x2
¬S2 ∨ y2
¬x2 ∨ ¬y2 ∨ S2
To generalize this process, let us now assume we have a CNF-SAT sub-
expression φ, and we wish to introduce a surrogate for φ, Sφ.
1
Sφ is a new variable. We need merely to enforce φ ↔ Sφ, and then use
1If φ is not in CNF, perform this procedure recursively on the sub-expressions of φ.
Note however that if a sub-expression of φ, call it ρ, is recursively embedded, it is vital
that the clauses that enforce the relationship between ρ and Sρ not be included in as part
of the original expression φ. Otherwise, Sφ and φ would not be equisatisfiable: A trivial
satisfying assignment could be found by violating one of the clauses enforcing ρ ↔ Sρ.
All clauses generated by any recursive applications of this process must be placed in the
top-level formula.
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Sφ in place of φ in the original formula. The simpler half is Sφ → φ. Since
φ is a Boolean formula in conjunctive normal form, we can distribute the
implication over the conjuncts, and thus we need only one constraint for
each conjunct c in φ. ∧
c∈φ
¬Sφ ∨ c
To enforce the other implication, φ→ Sφ, note still that φ is a collection
of conjuncts. The structure we have is∧
c∈φ
c
→ Sφ
To require that all conjuncts c be true to imply Sφ, we must introduce a
new surrogate for each conjunct c, Sc and replace the conjuncts c in the
above CNF by their corresponding surrogates Sc. As long as we also enforce∧
c∈φ(Sc ↔ c), this completes the embedding of φ: We may use the variable
Sφ in place of φ.
To enforce the condition Sc ↔ c, we add clauses for Sc → c and c→ Sc
to the top-level formula for each c. Since c is a collection of disjuncts, Sc → c
is given by
¬Sc ∨ c
Likewise, c→ Sc is given by
∧
d∈c d→ Sc, or∧
d∈c
(¬d ∨ Sc)
for each disjunct d in c.
If we wish to embed inequalities using this technique, they are first re-
duced to CNF-SAT using Warners’ reduction, and the resulting formula
embedded. However, it is very important to only perform the final Tseitin
transformation on the clauses that implement the comparison of the final bit
vectors. This is because we want the new variable introduced by the trans-
formation to be equivalent to the actual comparison of the numbers being
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compared. The clauses that in the “multiplication” and “addition” steps
implement arithmetic that computes the value of the left-hand side of the
inequality. If these clauses were included in the Tseitin transformation of
the inequality, the resulting formula would be satisfiable by simply violating
the rules of arithmetic when computing the value of the left-hand side.
3.3.4 Common voting rule reduction elements
There are common elements that we observed when constructing reductions
for the manipulation problem of multiple voting rules. Many voting rules
employ similar concepts such as pairwise comparison of candidates, elimi-
nating candidates who did poorly from further consideration, and awarding
a score to candidates based on their raw performance on the ballots and
then comparing those scores.
We engineered our reductions so that we could combine components that
implemented common elements seen in voting rules, allowing us to check
smaller components for correctness more easily, as well as simplify the task
of building reductions for new voting rules in the future.
Ballots
The first common task to consider is a representation of the ballots of the
voters. We have two representations that we use in our reductions. The
first representation stores the exact position in which a voter placed each
candidate on their ballot. We call this the positional ballot scheme. In this
scheme, we define a variable in our formula for each voter v, candidate c,
and position p, giving Vv,c,p. Positions are integers from 0 to m−1. Variable
Vv,c,p is true iff voter v ranked candidate c in position p. This is done for
every voter, manipulator and non-manipulator alike. The votes of the non-
manipulators are very simple to encode. We use single variable clauses to
set the state of variables for which we know the truth value. A reduction
using the positional ballot scheme produces clause
Vv,c,p
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for all v, c, p, if non-manipulator v put candidate c in position p, and clause
¬Vv,c,p
if non-manipulator v ranked candidate c in a position other than p. This
information is available at reduction-time, specified by the votes in the set
V , the vote profile of the election.
The votes of the manipulators are going to be determined by the solver,
so we must force the solver to assign valid votes to the manipulators. There
are three major sets of constraints to place constraints on how each manip-
ulator votes.
• Ensure that each manipulator does not rank two candidates in the
same position.
• Ensure that each manipulator ranks every candidate in some position.
• Ensure that no manipulator ranks a candidate in more than one posi-
tion.
We must force manipulators never to put two candidates in the same po-
sition. Such a constraint is straightforward to encode in CNF-SAT, so this
is done through a simple enumeration of the individual constraints. For each
manipulating voter v, distinct position p, and distinct pair of candidates c
and d, we introduce the clause
¬Vv,c,p ∨ ¬Vv,d,p
We must also force every candidate to be in some position. For every ma-
nipulating voter and candidate we have the clause∨
p∈{0,...,m−1}
Vv,c,p
There is no explicit provision to prevent a manipulator from placing a
candidate in more than one position. The previous two constraints form a
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bijection between each manipulator’s ballot positions and the candidates,
which implies that no candidate is in more than one position on any bal-
lot. We felt that the redundant clauses would enlarge the formulas to be
solved unnecessarily. Recent evidence suggests however that adding redun-
dant clauses to formulas when they are not strictly needed can lead to solvers
solving the formulas more quickly [Heu09]. This could be investigated fur-
ther.
The second representation we use in our reductions is the pairwise ballot
scheme. In this scheme, instead of encoding positions directly, we encode,
for each pair of candidates, which one outranks the other. For each voter
and pair of candidates, we have Pv,c,d, which is true iff voter v ranks candi-
date c above candidate d. The number of variables required is asymptotically
identical to the positional ballot scheme.
As before, encoding the non-manipulators’ votes is accomplished with
collection of single literal clauses that sets the state of the variables for the
non-manipulators’ ballots. We add the single literal clause
Pv,c,d
if candidate c is above candidate d on non-manipulator v’s ballot and
¬Pv,c,d
otherwise. Also, for all candidates c we add
¬Pv,c,c
To ensure the manipulators’ ballots are valid, we have three sets of con-
straints to apply.
• Ensure exactly one of Pv,c,d and Pv,d,c is true, for all distinct candidates
c and d.
• Ensure Pv,c,c is false for all candidates.
• Ensure Pv,c,d ∧ Pv,d,e → Pv,c,e for all distinct candidates c, d and e.
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The first set enforces asymmetry. The second enforces irreflexivity. The
third enforces transitivity. We can rephrase the first two statements above
into equivalent statements that are better for generating clauses in conjunc-
tive normal form. These are
• Ensure at least one of Pv,c,d and Pv,d,c is false, for all candidates c and
d.
• Ensure at least one of Pv,c,d and Pv,d,c is true, for all distinct candidates
c and d.
Note that one of these statements includes the word “distinct” and the
other does not. These statements are encoded in the formula as ∧
v∈M
c,d∈C
¬Pv,c,d ∨ ¬Pv,d,c
 ∧
 ∧
v∈M
c,d∈C,c6=d
Pv,c,d ∨ Pv,d,c

The third statement is encoded in the formula by∧
v∈M
c,d,e∈C
c 6=d,c6=e,d 6=e
¬Pv,c,d ∨ ¬Pv,d,e ∨ Pv,c,e
In each of our reductions of manipulation for various voting rules we will
use one of these two ballot schemes.
Eliminations
Some voting rules, including instant runoff voting and plurality with two-
candidate runoff in this work, have a concept of elimination. Candidates
who do not perform well in early rounds are eliminated. Candidates who
are eliminated are completely removed from further consideration. They
are, for all purposes, no longer on any of the ballots, and once eliminated, a
candidate can never return.
Our reductions for these two voting rules use a common encoding for
this concept of elimination. Elections in which eliminations occur always
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proceed in a series of rounds.
Depending on the voting rule, the number of rounds used will vary, so
we will let the set R be the set of rounds. For instant runoff voting, R is
{0, . . . ,m − 1} and for plurality with two-candidate runoff, R is {0, 1, 2}.
Round 0 is the initial state of the election, with no candidates eliminated.
The rule may then decide to eliminate one or more candidates, and those
candidates’ elimination statuses are set for round 1.
We use a variable Er,c to represent elimination. Er,c is true if and only if
candidate c is eliminated for round r. Since all candidates are in the election
to begin, we have ∧
c∈C
¬E0,c
Once a candidate is eliminated, that candidate cannot return. This next set
of clauses cascades the elimination status for a given candidate through to
subsequent rounds. ∧
c∈C
r∈R−{0,maxR}
¬Er,c ∨ Er+1,c
We only enumerate this clause over the “inner” rounds of R, excluding
round 0 and the last round, because no candidates have been eliminated in
round 0, and the last round has no subsequent round, so elimination statuses
of that round cannot and do not need to be carried anywhere.
The reductions for individual voting rules will specify further how can-
didates become eliminated, and how later rounds are evaluated when some
of the candidates have been eliminated.
Scores
Several of the reductions involve computing some intermediate result and
tallying up a score for each candidate. If we only used 0–1 integer program-
ming inequalities as black boxes, this would cause much duplication in the
resulting formulas. In a scoring protocol, comparing candidates’ total scores
requires a separate 0–1 integer programming inequality for each comparison,
each one having all the logic for multiplying coefficients by their indicator
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variables and for summing the summands. For example, ∑
v∈V ∪M
p∈{0,...,m−1}
αp · Vv,d,p
−
 ∑
v∈V ∪M
p∈{0,...,m−1}
αp · Vv,c,p
 ≤ −1
this is the 0–1 integer programming inequality that would be needed to
compare the scores of two candidates c and d, and ensure that c outscored d.
Having such an inequality for each non-preferred candidate would mean that
the clauses to compute the preferred candidate’s score would appear once for
every such inequality, not only giving an unnecessarily larger formula, but
also obscuring some information that might be helpful to a Satisfiability
solver by having duplicated variables that would always have the same value,
but having no explicit relationship in the formula.
To avoid this waste, we enhanced Warners’ reduction by taking each of
the fundamental operations used and allowing them to be applied separately.
We use this technique specially in our reductions to CNF-SAT. Candidate
scores are computed once, and are then referenced as needed in other parts
of the reduction. Applied to the example above, this means we place clauses
in the formula to compute each candidate’s total points awarded by the
scoring protocol, giving a bit vector representing each candidate’s score. We
can then apply the comparison step separately, essentially
Scorec =
∑
v∈V ∪M
p∈{0,...,m−1}
αp · Vv,c,p
for each candidate c, followed by
Scored − Scorec ≤ −1
to ensure c outscores d.
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3.3.5 Reductions from manipulation to 0–1 integer program-
ming
We now describe the individual reductions of manipulation instances to
0–1 integer programming, making use of the notation of CNF-SAT in some
places, for convenience, and applying the optimization described in Sec-
tion 3.3.4 for scores when reducing down to CNF-SAT. There are separate
descriptions for each voting rule.
Scoring protocols
Because of the similarity in all voting rules that are scoring protocols, we
were able to define a single reduction for all rules of this family. For scoring
protocols we use the positional ballot scheme described in Section 3.3.4.
The positional ballot scheme makes it very simple to define the rest of
the reduction. All we have to do is use the information contained in the
variables that encode the ballots to calculate each candidate’s total score,
then assert that the preferred candidate’s score is at least one point greater
than that of each other candidate.
Let α be the score vector for the scoring protocol manipulation problem
we are reducing. By applying Warners’ summation method, we easily build
up each candidate c’s score in a bit vector
Scorec =
∑
v∈V ∪M
p∈{0,...,m−1}
αp · Vv,c,p
then for each non-preferred candidate d and the preferred candidate c com-
pare the difference between the scores to the constant −1
Scored − Scorec ≤ −1
The resulting difference must be less than or equal to −1. This ensures the
preferred candidate has defeated every other candidate by at least one point
and is the unique winner.
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An alternate scoring protocol reduction
An interesting alternative representation for this problem, due to Chamber-
lin [Cha85], is to encode the problem in m! integers representing the number
of voters that cast their ballot for each permutation of the candidates. In
other words, encoding just the numerical voting profile. For example, with
three candidates a, b, and c, we have six integers, representing the number
of voters who vote for each permutation, a > b > c, a > c > b, b > a > c,
b > c > a, c > a > b, and c > b > a, respectively. To encode the non-
manipulators’ votes, we would specify minimums on each of these variables:
xi ≥ ni
where ni is the number of non-manipulators who ordered the candidates
in the ith permutation.
The number of manipulators is specified by encoding total number of
votes: ∑
i
xi = n+ #manipulators
Lastly the condition that the preferred candidate be the uniquely victori-
ous could be expressed through m− 1 inequalities. The coefficients applied
to the variables are determined by inspecting the order of the candidates
in the ith permutation, and calculating the point advantage that a vote so
cast gives to the preferred candidate. Below is an example using the Borda
count. Supposing that the preferred candidate is b, b must defeat a,
x1 + 2x2 − x3 − 2x4 + x5 − x6 ≤ 0
and b must defeat c,
−x1 + x2 − 2x3 − x4 + 2x5 + x6 ≤ 0
While this representation is simpler and yields a much simpler reduction
for smaller numbers of candidates, we nonetheless feel it has shortcomings.
It has a O(m!) growth in the number of candidates in the model, whereas
3.3. REDUCTIONS AND STATE-OF-THE-ART SOLVERS 59
the representation we have used is O(m2) in the number of candidates.
We also feel that it is more difficult to adapt this representation to other
voting rules. Consider the instant runoff voting rule. Since this voting
rule eliminates candidates who score poorly, to calculate scores in successive
rounds would require conditionally selecting new coefficients for the variables
xi, depending on which candidates are eliminated. In his article Chamberlin
did show results for the instant runoff voting rule (known as Hare voting in
that article). If the coefficients were computed at reduction time, which we
believe must be the case as we see no way calculate the coefficients within
the reduction while retaining its simplicity, there would have to be alternate
inequalities in the model for every possible set of eliminated candidates.
This gives a O(2m · m!) growth of the model in the best case (recall too
that each inequality is of size m!). This is why we opted not to use this
representation.
Instant runoff voting
In instant runoff voting, the next candidate to be eliminated in each round
is the one who has the fewest first place votes among the remaining (non-
eliminated) candidates. While it seems at first glance that the positional
ballot scheme might be appropriate, it is difficult with the positional scheme
to figure out who the ballot goes to if the candidate in the first position has
been eliminated. A ballot with an eliminated candidate in the first position
needs to be counted in the subsequent rounds as a vote for the candidate
in the second position (or the third if the second candidate has also been
eliminated, etc.).
Thus, we use the pairwise ballot scheme for our instant runoff voting ma-
nipulation reduction. We will also use the elimination mechanism described
in Section 3.3.4. The determination of which candidates to eliminate in a
round uses a count of first place votes, ignoring those candidates already
eliminated. Since the set of eliminated candidates changes every round, the
assignment of points to the remaining candidates also changes. Let us define
a generalized subformula which will be true iff the candidate c has earned a
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point from a voter v in round r. The points each candidate earns will later
be summed and compared to determine who is eliminated for round r + 1.
First, for a candidate c to earn any points, they must not already be
eliminated.
¬Er,c
And second, they must be ranked higher on voter v’s ballot than every other
non-eliminated candidate d, which we may alternatively state as either d was
already eliminated, or c must be ranked higher than d.
∧
d∈C\c
Er,d ∨ Pv,c,d
For future convenience, we embed each subformula for a first place point
as the surrogate
Pointc,v,r ↔ ¬Er,c ∧
∧
d∈C\c
Er,d ∨ Pv,c,d
To compute a candidate’s fate in the next round, we compare their total
number of first place points to that of each other candidate. The candidate
with the fewest first place points in a given round is eliminated. If two
candidates tie for fewest first place points, both are eliminated. This is
equivalent to stating that candidates who have more points than some other
non-eliminated candidate are protected from elimination, and those that fail
to meet this criterion are eliminated.
We can tally the points of the each of the candidates as a score and then
compare them with inequalities. Let
Scorer,c =
∑
v∈V ∪M
Pointc,v,r
be the summation of the first place points c has earned in round r. For
a particular round r, candidate c has more points than candidate d if and
only if neither candidate has been eliminated and c’s score is greater than
d’s score.
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We then proceed as before and embed the status of the contest between
each pair of candidates as a surrogate Bc,d,r (B for “beats”).
Bc,d,r ↔ ¬Er,c ∧ ¬Er,d ∧ (Scored,v,r − Scorec,v,r ≤ −1)
We should now be able to decide the elimination statuses for the next
round. Candidates that “beat” at least one other candidate are protected
from elimination and the others are eliminated. There is one issue that must
be addressed however. Since we are using the “ties eliminate” model here,
there is the possibility that more than one candidate could be eliminated
per round. Since we fix the number of rounds at m, it may occur that there
is exactly one candidate remaining before the last round. Obviously this
candidate is the winner, but if the remaining rounds are carried out, under
the current rules that last candidate will fail to beat any other candidate,
simply because there are no other candidates to beat, and would thus be
eliminated. We can correct this situation by adding as a requirement to
elimination that there is some other candidate remaining in the race.
Er+1,c ↔
 ∨
d∈C\c
¬Er,d
 ∧ ∧
d∈C\c
¬Bc,d,r

All of the above clauses are instantiated for each round inR = {0, . . . ,m−1}.
The final requirement is to make sure the preferred candidate cp is the
unique winner, which they are if they remain in round m−1 while everyone
else is eliminated.
¬Em−1,cp ∧
∧
d∈C\cp
Em−1,d
Plurality with two-candidate runoff
Plurality with two-candidate runoff shares the same basic mechanics as in-
stant runoff voting: The only major change is the number of rounds and the
criteria for elimination. Instant runoff voting has m rounds (m− 1 elimina-
tion steps), and plurality with two-candidate runoff is fixed to three rounds
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(two elimination steps). The criterion for passing from the first round to
the second is more strict. As we have defined plurality with two-candidate
runoff, if more than two candidates are tied in the first round they all proceed
to the runoff round. If one candidate holds the lead by itself with others tied
immediately behind it, all candidates in the pack that immediately trails are
eliminated.
We have already defined most of the components needed to reduce ma-
nipulation of plurality with two-candidate runoff in Section 3.3.4 and in
the reduction from manipulation of instant runoff voting. We will use the
same representation for the ballots, and the same constraints on manipula-
tor votes. The elimination mechanic will also be used. The set of rounds is
simply R = 0, 1, 2. It starts in the same manner,∧
c∈C
¬E0,c
There is now only one round for which elimination status must be carried
over, we can specify that with simply∧
c∈C
¬E1,c ∨ E2,c
Observe that the above constraint is equivalent to the corresponding con-
straint from the reduction of instant runoff voting, but it is simplified be-
cause of the fixed number of rounds.
Next, we copy and use the points and pairwise outscore (“beats”) mech-
anisms verbatim. In the next formula, we make use of the Bc,d,r variables,
and assume that they have been set as described in the reduction for instant
runoff voting above. To advance, a candidate must either trail no other
candidates, or trail exactly one and tie none. We introduce the variable
T 0c ↔
∧
d∈C\c
Bd,c,0
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to represent candidate c trailing no other candidates. We also introduce
T 1c ↔ ¬T 0c ∧
∑
d∈C\c
Bd,c,0 ≤ 1
to represent candidate c trailing exactly one other candidate. The candidate
will advance if it either trails no one, or trails exactly one and ties none. The
latter condition can be restated as “trails exactly one and beats everyone
except himself and the one he trails.” Thus we can simply count the number
of candidates beaten and ensure it is at least m− 2.
Assembling all the above, the formula for elimination in round 1 for a
candidate c (we give the contrapositive for clarity) is then
¬E1,c ↔ T 0c ∨
T 1c ∧ ∑
d∈C\c
Bc,d,0 ≥ m− 2

To advance to round 2, a candidate may lose to no other candidates in
round 1.
E2,c ↔
∧
d∈C\c
¬Bd,c,1
And again, as with instant runoff voting, the requirement that the pre-
ferred candidate cp is the unique winner is expressed by requiring that cp
remain, and everyone but cp be eliminated in round 2.
¬E2,cp ∧
∧
d∈C\cp
E2,d
Copeland voting
Copeland voting is one of the most basic possible extensions of the Condorcet
criterion into a total voting system that always produces a winner. The
Condorcet criterion says the winner should be the candidate that defeats
all others in pairwise elections, if such a candidate exists. When one does
not exist, Copeland voting tallies the number of pairwise elections that each
candidate has won, and in the most common formulation awards one-half of
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a point for a tie—but the prize for a tie could be anywhere in the range [0, 1].
Copeland manipulation is NP-complete for rational values other than 12 .
Because Copeland voting is based on pairwise rankings between two
candidates on each ballot, this reduction also uses the pairwise represen-
tation of the ballot used above in instant runoff voting and plurality with
two-candidate runoff. Copeland voting does not need the elimination mech-
anism, as there is only a single tally of the Copeland score. The Copeland
score is calculated by determining the winner of each pairwise election be-
tween two candidates, and summing the points awarded to a candidate for
winning or tying in each of its pairwise elections.
The following subformula computes the pairwise election results between
two candidates. We reuse the letter B for “beats,” but it is distinct from
how it is defined and used in the previous reductions above. Here, Bc,d is
true iff there are more ballots that list candidate c is in a higher position
than candidate d than list them in the other order.
Bc,d ↔
∑
v∈V ∪M
−1 · Pv,c,d + 1 · Pv,d,c ≤ −1
There are three possible outcomes for a pairwise election: a victory for
one candidate or the other, or a tie. This cannot be represented in a single
variable. Bc,d is distinct from Bd,c because of the possibility of a tie in c and
d’s pairwise contest. One of these variables being true and the other false
indicates that one candidate was victorious in the pairwise election, while
both false indicates a tie. Both cannot be true simultaneously.
The Copeland scores of the candidates are calculated from the status
of the “beats” variables. Every time the candidate achieves a pairwise win,
they earn a single point. This leads to a problem with points for ties however.
Since we are working only with integral value, fractional values cannot be
used. To incorporate rational values for a tie into the Copeland voting
reduction, point values are multiplied by the denominator of the tie value.
In the case of Copeland when the purse awarded for a tie is 12 , the effective
point values awarded by the reduction are 0 for a loss, 1 for a tie, and 2 for
a win. If 23 of a point are awarded for a tie, the values are 0, 2, and 3.
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To determine the winner of the election, we check if there is a candidate
that has a better Copeland score than the others. Summing the candidates’
Copeland scores is done as described in Section 3.3.4. ww, wt are the point
values associated with a pairwise win and tie respectively.
Scorec =
∑
d∈C\c
ww · (Bc,d ∧ ¬Bd,c) +
∑
d∈C\c
wt · (¬Bc,d ∧ ¬Bd,c)
To make the preferred candidate cp the unique winner, cp’s Copeland
score must be greater than that of every other candidate∧
d∈C\cp
Scored − Scorecp ≤ −1

Chapter 4
Results
We used our software to compute the manipulation numbers of randomly
generated elections. We had 48 test sets of elections, ranging in size from 1
to 128 non-manipulating voters in powers of two, having three and five can-
didates, and having votes distributed according to the uniform distribution,
the Condorcet distribution with p = 0.6, and the spatial distribution using
three dimensions. Each of these test sets contained 1000 elections. We used
the Find-Firstmethod described in Section 3.1 to compute lower and upper
bounds on each manipulation number for all 1000 elections in each data set,
under the voting rules plurality, plurality with two-candidate runoff, veto,
Borda count, instant runoff voting, and Copeland. Though we experimented
using other solvers, all of our final results were computed by the Clasp solver
solving CNF-SAT formulas [GKS10]. We did not use the pseudo-Boolean
optimization capabilities of the Clasp solver because our reductions were
crafted to target 0–1 integer programming and Satisfiability. We look
forward to adapting our reductions to target the pseudo-Boolean optimiza-
tion problem in the future. For each instance of a manipulation problem
(C, V,R, cp, k), the solver was given two minutes to solve the reduction of
the instance. With this time limit in place, the Find-First search pro-
cedure produced lower and upper bounds on each manipulation number of
each instance.
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4.1 Precision
Using a fixed two-minute time limit for each instance meant that some
problems, especially those instances with more candidates and more non-
manipulating voters, did not have their manipulation numbers computed
exactly, but rather had them bounded by lower and upper bound estimates
of their true value. We found that we were able to compute the manipula-
tion numbers of most instances exactly, and those that we were not able to
compute exactly we were able to bound reasonably tightly.
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Figure 4.1: Mean size of the gap between the lower and upper bounds for
all manipulation numbers and all rules.
Figure 4.1 shows the mean size of the gap between the lower and upper
bounds we calculated for the manipulation numbers for each of the uni-
form, Condorcet, and spatial distributions, with three and five candidates.
Figure 4.1 includes data for all rules and manipulation numbers. The great-
est mean gap size is 6.77 for the spatial distribution with five candidates,
and this occurs at 128 non-manipulators. Using our method, it is expected
that one can compute the manipulation number for a random spatially dis-
tributed election on five or fewer candidates and 128 non-manipulators to
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within 7 manipulators.
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Figure 4.2: Mean size of the gap between the lower and upper bounds for
all manipulation numbers and all distributions, with three candidates.
Figure 4.2 shows the mean size of the gap between the lower and upper
bounds that the solver established on manipulation numbers it was comput-
ing. The value of zero for most of the data points means that for the vast
majority of these small instances the solver was able to compute the exact
value of the all manipulation numbers.
Only the veto rule presented any difficulty at this problem size. It is
worth noting that the reduction for the veto rule was simply a na¨ıve ap-
plication of the general scoring protocol reduction using the scoring vector
α = 〈1, 1, 0〉. The solver had no special knowledge that only vetoes needed
to be distributed amongst the non-preferred candidates. Instead, the solver
was forced to attempt to arrange all the candidates on every ballot, trying
to find some arrangement that would yield a better outcome. The lesson
here is that generalized reductions can easily obscure meaningful structure
in a problem that a solver could take advantage of if that structure were
more apparent in the formula.
Figure 4.3 shows the corresponding data for five candidate elections. As
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Figure 4.3: Mean size of the gap between the lower and upper bounds for
all manipulation numbers and all distributions, with five candidates.
in Figure 4.2, we see the same issue with the veto rule. It is not surprising
to see the same difficulty remain in larger problem instances. The problem
is exacerbated with more candidates, further underscoring the need for a
specialized reduction when additional structure is available.
Additionally we see some difficulty with instant runoff voting on the
five candidate problems. This too is not particularly surprising, as instant
runoff voting is the rule with the most complex reduction we examined in
this work. Every round of eliminations is simulated in the formula. The
result of the election is very far removed from the state of the ballots in
the formulas, through a long chain of rounds and eliminations, and each
elimination changes the interpretation of the ballots in the later rounds.
Changes in the ballots likely entail a considerable avalanche of changes,
giving deductions and learned conflict clauses minimal value.
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4.2 Expected and actual manipulation numbers
The next measurement of interest is the actual size of the manipulation
numbers of our test elections compared with their theoretical growth rates.
Figure 4.4 shows the mean of all manipulation numbers except the first,
or equivalently, the minimum coalition size to make a random candidate
who would lose without the help of the manipulators become a winner.
Immediately apparent is a large separation in the constant factor between
the uniform, Condorcet, and spatial distributions, with uniform requiring a
smaller coalition than Condorcet, and Condorcet in turn needing fewer ma-
nipulators than the spatial distribution. Not immediately apparent from
the figure however is the growth rate of these minimum coalition sizes.
Based on the analyses of Procaccia and Rosenschein, Xia and Conitzer, and
Walsh, we would expect these minimum coalition sizes to grow as Θ(
√
n)
[PR07, XC08, Wal09b]. Figure 4.5 is a similar plot of manipulation numbers,
but here they are divided by
√
n. While the observations for the uniform
distribution appear in line with the theoretical expectation, the data for the
Condorcet and spatial distributions are less well-behaved.
Examining the same progression of actual minimum coalition size group-
ing by the voting rule used, Figure 4.6 reveals that Borda appears to require
the fewest manipulators to alter its outcomes. The relationship between the
other voting rules is less distinct; there is no one rule clearly needing more
manipulators.
Applying the same transformation as before and dividing the mean ma-
nipulation numbers by
√
n, Figure 4.7 shows that the mean manipulation
numbers appear to be growing faster than the theoretical Θ(
√
n) bound.
This figure illustrates that this unexpected pattern of growth does not ap-
pear to be related to the voting rule. The apparent ω(
√
n) growth appears
to be related to the spatial and Condorcet distributions. The votes of the
elections generated according to these distributions were independent and
identically distributed. Procaccia and Rosenschein demonstrated that the
Condorcet distribution satisfies the final condition required for their theorem
to apply, and the spatial distribution also seems to satisfy it.
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Figure 4.4: Mean minimum coalition size to make a random non-winning
candidate win, for all rules.
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Figure 4.5: Mean minimum coalition size to make a random non-winning
candidate win divided by the square root of the number of non-manipulators,
for all rules.
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Figure 4.6: Mean minimum coalition size to make a random non-winning
candidate win, for all distributions and three and five candidates.
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Figure 4.7: Mean minimum coalition size to make a random non-winning
candidate win divided by the square root of the number of non-manipulators,
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Figure 4.8 is similar to Figure 4.7, but is restricted to instances from
the uniform distribution. Here the growth rate appears to be well bounded
by the theoretical Θ(
√
n). Veto is seen to require the largest coalition on
average, followed by Copeland, instant runoff voting, plurality and plurality
with runoff, and Borda.
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Figure 4.8: Mean minimum coalition size to make a random non-winning
candidate win divided by the square root of the number of non-manipulators,
for the uniform distribution only and three and five candidates.
4.3 Two-to-three possible winner gap
Conitzer and Sandholm argued for the non-existence of voting rules that
are usually hard to manipulate [CS06] by considering the case where two
candidates could be made to win, but three could not. They presented the
procedure Find-Two-Winners which, given an instance of a manipulation
problem where exactly two candidates could be made to win, it would iden-
tify those candidates and provide the votes for the manipulators to cast.
They argued that the manipulation problem of voting rules that are desir-
able to use in practice would have an overwhelming proportion of instances
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for which Find-Two-Winners is applicable. Figure 4.9 shows the mean of
the second and third manipulation numbers—the minimum coalition sizes
needed to make two candidates and three candidates win—and the regions
where Find-Two-Winners works. We can see that the window where we
can trust the output of Find-Two-Winners is relatively small across all
the distributions we tested.
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Figure 4.9: Mean minimum coalition size to make two or three candidates
out of five possible unique winners, for all voting rules.
The same pattern appears when data is grouped by the voting rule. Fig-
ure 4.10 illustrates a similar occurrence with the Copeland, instant runoff
voting, and Borda rules. Figure 4.11 shows the same for the plurality, plu-
rality with two-candidate runoff, and veto rules.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
By reducing manipulation problems to Satisfiability and employing state-
of-the-art solvers we were able to investigate the manipulation power of
coalitions in a variety of circumstances, and to determine the minimum
number of manipulators a coalition would need to be able to manipulate
an election. By computing manipulation numbers using reductions it was a
straightforward job to produce results that we were confident were correct.
The reductions were essentially literal simulations of the various voting rules
that tasked the solver with working backwards from a foregone conclusion
(that a preferred candidate is the unique winner of an election) through
to a set of manipulator ballots that accomplished the assumed result. By
using an appropriate search harness, we were able to construct very precise
estimates of the manipulation numbers for the test elections, and where we
were not able to determine the exact value of a manipulation number, we
were able to establish lower and upper bounds. Though the largest instances
tested (those with five candidates and 128 non-manipulators) had larger
gaps between the bounds, this is because of the fixed time-limit permitted
to each individual solver instance. Raising this limit would surely result in
more precise bounds.
The simplicity of the reductions was both an aid and a hindrance. We
were able to construct reductions simply and with great confidence that
they were correct, but their simplicity was also their undoing. As was seen
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in the performance the reduction for the veto rule, the solver had difficulty
solving what should have been an easy problem. The implementation of the
veto reduction using a generalized reduction for scoring rules was clearly
suboptimal. Where an optimal algorithm would only have to decide which
candidates to veto (and in the unweighted case it becomes a matter of simple
arithmetic), the solver attempted to find solutions by searching through the
entire state space of the manipulators’ ballots. We have seen that adding
redundant clauses to a formula can result in dramatic gains in solver per-
formance [Heu09]. Clearly there is value in attempting to provide more
information and reveal the essential structure of the problem to the solver
in any reduction, as our difficulty with the veto rule illustrates. Future work
would do well to consider more carefully the actual techniques and strategies
employed by state-of-the-art solvers, and design reductions that simplify the
solver’s task and maximize its efficiency.
The pseudo-Boolean optimization problem and its associated state-of-
the-art solvers presents further prospects for future research. The definition
of pseudo-Boolean optimization seems to be a very natural reduction tar-
get for manipulation problems. It is very similar to the combination of
0–1 integer programming and CNF-SAT that we used in this work, allow-
ing 0–1 integer programming-style inequalities alongside CNF-SAT clauses.
pseudo-Boolean optimization also has an annual competition for solvers that
occurs as part of the annual Conference on Theory and Applications of Sat-
isfiability Testing [MR10, SS10].
In our results, we could see that the manipulation numbers of elections
drawn from the uniform distribution were consistent with the results of
Procaccia and Rosenschein in that their growth was bounded as Θ(
√
n).
Our figures for the Condorcet and spatial distributions however did not
show the same consistency, despite both distributions meeting the condi-
tions for Procaccia and Rosenschein’s theorem to apply. It is likely that
we did not analyze elections with sufficient numbers of non-manipulators
for the Θ(
√
n)-bounded growth to appear. With continuing advances in the
state-of-the-art in Satisfiability or pseudo-Boolean optimization solvers,
combined with improved reductions that minimize wasted work and max-
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imize the applicability of learned conflict clauses, this technique could be
extended to work for even larger instances.
We could also see that the region where manipulation problems are solv-
able by Conitzer and Sandholm’s Find-Two-Winners is not as large as
previously thought. Find-Two-Winners is a useful algorithm to apply if
one can be confident that a given coalition size is likely to be in the re-
gion of one to two possible winners rather than the region of two or more
possible winners. We have seen due to Walsh that for the veto rule, uni-
formly distributed elections and a coalition that is 3
√
n in size is over 95%
likely to be able to make a random candidate win [Wal09b]. Our results for
other voting rules, also for the uniform distribution, show that the mean
minimum coalition size to make a random non-winning candidate win tends
to be between 0.6
√
n and 1.4
√
n. These numbers could serve as a useful
guideline for when a manipulating coalition could be confident in applying
Find-Two-Winners, and when it should consider other methods.

Appendix A
Code
Our software implementation of the election test set generator, brute force
manipulation number solver, manipulation problem reductions, common
voting rule reduction constructs, Find-First and the associated search
harness are all available from our git repository at http://github.com/
cconnett/nplib.
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